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While gray market goods have been traditionally imported into
the United States from Europe and Asian countries, there has
been an influx in recent years of gray market imports from
Latin America, particularly from Argentina and Brazil. For
these gray market exporters, recent developments in U.S. law
will greatly affect their future activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 6, 1987, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral argument in K-Mart v. Cartier, Inc., a case that may deter-
mine the future of gray market trade.' Barring a decision based on
jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court's decision should resolve
the mounting tension among the circuits regarding the validity of
the Customs Service's regulations on gray market goods and possi-
bly restrict gray market goods from being sold in the United
States.2
Customs Service regulations have essentially eliminated any
restrictions that may have been imposed on the import of gray
market goods by the Tariff Act of 1930. Specifically, the Customs
Service has refused to enforce the language of the Act which spe-
cifically bars all gray market goods from entry into the United
States.' Until the recent COPIAT decision, challenges to the legal-
ity of the Customs Service's regulations had proven to be
unsuccessful."
1. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984) rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) cert. granted sub
norn. K-Mart v. Cartier, 107 S.Ct. 642 (1986) (commonly referred to as COPIAT). See also
Oral Argument Held in Gray Market Case, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 581
(Oct. 8, 1987).
2. The United States Customs Service has issued regulations (19 C.F.R. §133.21(c)(1)-
(3) (1985)) refusing to literally enforce §26 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1526
(1982)).
3. 19 U.S.C. §1526 (1982).
4. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) aff'd on
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Gray market imports have also been challenged on the claim
that they violate the Lanham Trademark Act.5 Section 42 of the
Act provides that
... no article of imported merchandise which shall copy or sim-
ulate... a [registered] trademark... shall be admitted to entry
at any customshouse of the United States. ..
While section 42 is effective in enjoining counterfeit goods, gray
market goods, because they are genuine, do not fall within the
Act's provisions. Nevertheless, some uncertainty exists as to
whether the plain language of the statute fails to bar importation if
the goods are genuine."
Finally, those who are attempting to halt gray market imports
have claimed that the imports are a violation of section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, which focuses on unfair import practices." Rely-
ing on this section, the International Trade Commission recom-
mended a halt to all gray market imports.9 President Reagan, how-
ever, disapproved of the Commission's recommendations as being
at odds with the Treasury Department's interpretations of the sec-
tion, at the same time noting that the Cabinet Council on Com-
merce and Trade was in the process of studying the issue.10
The legal debate concerning the desirability of a ban on gray
market imports should not be separated from an economic analysis
of the issue. Unfortunately, many of the decisions on the validity
of the gray market have suffered from weak economic analysis.
The purpose of the article is to examine some of the premises that
other grounds, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 791 (1986); Olympus
Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
But see COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918; Ross, Court Deal's Setback to Gray Market, Wash. Post,
May 7, 1986, Bus. Sec.
5. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1124 (1982).
6. Id.
7. Monte Carlo Shirts, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l, 767 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983); DEP Corp. v.
Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1980); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F.2d
539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); El Greco Leather Products Co., Inc. v.
Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States
Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983); United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp.
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), action dismissed, 172 F.
Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
8. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1337 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
9. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries (Duracell), 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (1984), disap-
proved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982), 50 Fed. Reg. 1655,
reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub nom. Duracell, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10. See note 9, 50 Fed. Reg. at 1655.
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support the gray market jurisprudence and to present an alterna-
tive economic framework with which one can analyze the social
utility of an active gray market.
Sales of trademarked articles through "unauthorized" chan-
nels have been called gray market sales. "Unauthorized" means
that the sale is made through a seller who is not authorized by the
manufacturer, distributor or trademark registrant. "Authorized"
means that the manufacturer establishes through a contractual
agreement an exclusive territory or conditions of resale. As part of
the agreement, the manufacturer, distributor or trademark regis-
trant will generally agree to sell only to particular entities and not
other entities that may compete with the authorized channel. The
distribution of goods through the gray market has also been called
parallel distribution. Gray market and parallel distribution are
used synonymously in this paper. Gray market sales are to be dis-
tinguished from counterfeit sales in that the item sold is "genuine"
in terms of its manufacturer, but its distribution is unauthorized."
Gray markets exist in both a domestic and international con-
text. In the domestic case, the domestic seller is an unauthorized
seller of a domestic manufactured product. In an international
context, the domestic seller is an unauthorized seller of an im-
ported product from a foreign manufacturer, distributor or retailer.
The sale is unauthorized because some United States entity is reg-
istered as the owner or licensee of the trademark. The owner or
licensee can either be an independent U.S. firm or a subsidiary of
the foreign manufacturer or distributor. The protection of trade-
marks by means, such as suits for infringement by counterfeit
sales, has evolved from common law principles and have been sup-
plemented by various state and federal registration laws.
This paper deals with the international gray market. There are
no reliable estimates of the dollar volume of gray market imports.
Several sources have estimated that the gray market may have im-
ported as many as sixty thousand (60,000) luxury automobiles in
11. An authorized seller may also deal in the gray market. For example, an authorized
dealer may purchase the trademark product outside its authorized supplier, such as through
another dealer or another distributor who is not its authorized distributor or a third party
outside the authorized distribution network. See Part II C and D, infra. Most agreements
have terms in addition to the rights pertaining to an exclusive territory, such as the dealer is
only permitted to buy from a certain supplier. Thus, unauthorized generally refers to pri-
vate contractual agreements and not necessarily to a violation of statutes or regulations. An
exception to this may be the U.S. Custom's regulations and legislation, most particularly 19
C.F.R. §133.21.
[Vol. 19:1
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1985.12 Assuming an average import price of thirty thousand dol-
lars ($30,000) per vehicle, the value of gray market imports for lux-
ury automobiles alone would amount to 1.8 billion dollars. Another
source has reported a figure of 6 billion dollars for all types of gray
market imports in 1984.'3 Gray market imports generally consist of
high quality, brand name goods. The Department of Commerce
lists the following types of goods that have been imported through
the gray market. 4
12. Holusha, Unauthorized Sales Up for Cars from Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1985,
at D1, col. 1.
13. Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at
89.
14. Apparel and fashions
Appliances, small
Auto parts (Toyota)
Automobiles (Mercedes Benz, BMW, Porsche and Jaguar)
Baby care products (Johnson & Johnson)
Batteries (Duracell)
Boats
Business equipment (including computers, calculators, and typewriters)
Champagne (Dom Perignon & other luxury champagnes)
Ceramics
Chinaware
Construction equipment (Komatsu)
Cosmetics and fragrances (Revlon, Elizabeth Arden, Warner/Lauren, Yves Saint
Laurent, Jacqueline Cochran, Alfin, Halston, Redken, Paco Rabanne, Warner)
Crystal and glassware (Waterford)
Electronics, including (televisions, radios, audio equipment, video games,
electronic musical equipment, tape and video recorders and supplies)
Feminine protection products
Floor care items
Food
Forklift trucks
Home and garden equipment
Housewares
Leather goods (including luggage and shoes)
Optics
Organs
Outboard motors (Evinrude, Johnson)
Pharmaceuticals
Photocopiers
Photographic equipment and supplies (Canon, Kodak, Nikon, Fuji, Minolta,
Pentax, Hasselblad, Tokina, Vivitar, Olympus, Ricoh)
Recordings (including phonorecords and tapes)
Semiconductors
Silverware
Ski equipment (Lange, Nordica, Rossignol)
Sporting goods
Tires
Toiletries
Toys
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The Department of Commerce also lists twenty-three coun-
tries as the source of gray market goods.1" The source of gray mar-
ket imports can be from a country other than its origin of manu-
facture. Gray market imports of luxury automobiles are almost
exclusively manufactured in Europe, while cameras are generally
produced in Japan.
The Department of Commerce classifies the different types of
organizations as either favoring or opposing gray market imports."6
For example, K-Mart, Montgomery Ward, W. Bell & Co. and 47th
Street Photo favor gray market imports. The Coalition to Preserve
the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) is an organiza-
tion comprised of members who oppose gray market imports.
Watches and clocks (Seiko, Rolex, Cartier)
THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, US. DEP. OF COMMERCE. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PARAL-
LEL IMPORTS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS, Al (1985) [hereinafter D.O.C.].
Bruce Yandle has argued that the reason foreign manufactured goods have increased in
reputational value in the United States compared to domestically produced goods may not
be due to design or planning, but rather because of U.S. quotas and tariffs imposed on
imports under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or other restrictions on
international trade such as the voluntary accord between the United States and Japan deal-
ing with automobiles. Yandle, Quality Regulation in Developing Countries, (Clemson Uni-
versity, March, 1987)(unpublished manuscript). For example, a per unit tariff added to for-
eign automobiles will narrow the relative U.S. price compared to the underlying relative
foreign prices of high quality (price) goods compared to low quality (price) goods, thereby
favoring the importation of high quality goods. A quota that restricts the number of im-
ported goods will also favor high quality imports. The addition of a fixed transportation
cost, regardless of quality, will also reduce the relative U.S. price of high quality. It is inter-
esting to note that almost all of the authorized sales in the gray market consist of the top-
of-the-line products. Some have also argued that unauthorized sales have been of lower
quality. For an analysis of the importance of quality assurance, see Part 1I.
15. D.O.C., supra note 14, at 5.
Australia Japan
Belgium Korea
Brazil Mexico
Bulgaria Netherlands
Canada Philippines
China Portugal
Federal Republic Singapore
of Germany Spain
France Sweden
Hong Kong Switzerland
Indonesia United Kingdom
Italy Uruguay
16. Id. at 2.
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# of Firms # of Firms
Favoring Opposing
Gray Market Gray Market
-Trade Associations 7 4
-Retailers 8 41
-Wholesalers/Distributors/
Importers 12 2
-Employees of discount
catalog showroom chain 178
-U.S. wholly-owned
subsidiaries of foreign
corporations 11
-U.S. corporations with
foreign distributors/
licenses 3
-U.S. authorized distributors 4
-U.S. Corporations, no
relationship to foreign
corporation given 3
As a general rule gray market distributors or retailers pay
lower prices than U.S. authorized distributors or retailers, thereby
creating price differences. In many cases, but not all, the price of
gray market goods is lower to the U.S. consumer.1 7 A price differ-
ence at some level in the distribution chain accounts for the exis-
tence of a gray market. This paper examines three alternative hy-
potheses to explain the existence of a gray market: (1) free-riding
off the trademark; (2) price discrimination and (3) Robinson-Pat-
man constraints. The gray market in the United States is primarily
a phenomena of the 1980s. Accordingly, the hypotheses are tested
(screened) in a very crude sense by requiring consistency with
other changes that occurred in the 1980s. One such major change
was the rapid appreciation of the dollar during the period of 1980
through 1985. Another change that does not have an exact time
correlation, but may operate with a lag, is the evolution of foreign
law, especially since the Treaty of Rome (1958) that governs the
European Economic Community (a major source of some parallel
17. See, e.g., Certain Alkaline Batteries, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 1616 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter
Certain Alkaline Batteries] (parallel imports of certain alkaline batteries apparently sold for
the same retail price as authorized retailers). For a list of parallel imports selling at lower
prices, see D.O.C., supra note 14.
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imports). Other largely qualitative evidence is used when
appropriate.
II. FREE-RIDER ARGUMENTS
A. Introduction
Gray market imports by definition involve a trademark. A
trademark is an asset that embodies the accumulated goodwill of
consumers. While a trademark is an intangible asset, there are cer-
tain property rights that a trademark has in common with tangible
assets, such as the right of exclusion and the right to transfer.
Without the right of exclusion, a trademark, similar to an automo-
bile or house, will have little or no market value unless the owner
can exclude others from its use. For example, if a trademark owner
did not have the right to exclude others, then any manufacturer
could simply use the trademark of another (e.g., counterfeit goods).
If someone other than the trademark owner can receive the bene-
fits of trademark investments without having to pay, then fewer
resources will be invested in trademarks. Exclusive rights granted
to trademark owners can be defended on grounds, similar to pat-
ents, as a means to create investment incentives. Opponents of
gray markets have argued that parallel importers free-ride off U.S.
investments in trademarks."'
In order to more fully understand the free-rider argument it is
useful to understand (a) why some goods are associated with trade-
marks and others are not; (b) how trademarks benefit consumers;
(c) what kinds of investments are made to create reputational
value or goodwill; and (d) what pricing and institutional arrange-
ments are necessary to create incentives to invest in and preserve
the value of trademarks (i.e., prevent free-riding). Recent economic
literature on quality assurance discussed in Section B addresses
18. See LEXECON, INC., THE ECONOMICS OF GRAY-MARKET IMPORTS (1985)[hereinafter
LEXECON]. The above report was prepared for the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks (COPIAT). COPIAT is an association of U.S. corporations and trade
associations. Many COPIAT members are U.S. subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers, others
are U.S. manufacturers who also manufacture and distribute their products abroad through
foreign subsidiaries or licensees; still others are U.S. retailers, publishing firms and advertis-
ing agencies. See also Certain Alkaline Batteries, supra note 17 (protection of the trade-
mark by preventing free-riding was the basis of the majority opinion and in the separate
opinion of Vice Chairman Liebeler); Knoll, Gray Market Imports: Causes, Consequences,
and Responses (1985 unpublished manuscript)(presents a strong argument in defense of re-
stricting parallel imports such as a ban based on the free-rider argument).
[Vol. 19:1
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these questions. 19 Sections C and D examine how the gray market
may be a market response to exchange rate movements without
free-riding off the reputational value of trademarks. In contrast,
Section E examines free-riding by gray market sellers who may of-
fer lower quality products or services compared to the claims made
by trademark owners. The parallel market will lower U.S. trade-
mark values (expressed in dollars) regardless of whether it is the
result of exchange rate adjustments or free-riding. However, the
gray market in the former case is beneficial to consumers, whereas
in the latter case it is harmful to consumers. The analysis in Part
II assumes a competitive market in trademark goods in order to
distinguish free-riding from price discrimination that requires, in-
ter alia, market power.
B. Quality Assurance
A trademark would have zero value in a world of perfect infor-
mation because consumers could costlessly determine variations in
quality and performance among products.'" Certain products have
the characteristic of not being able to costlessly determine quality
before purchase (e.g., the list of products listed in Part I).1I More-
over, for many goods, the sellers' statements (or advertisements)
about quality or warranties require enforcement costs (e.g., time
and legal costs) that can exceed the value of performance if such
statements are deceptive. Under these circumstances, a firm may
have an incentive to deceptively sell a lower quality product. If a
consumer receives a product of a quality at least as high as explic-
19. There are a number of free-riding arguments that have been developed in the liter-
ature. Quality assurance is an inherent attribute of trademarks and will be the focus of
analysis. As shall be discussed, other free-rider arguments are related to quality assurance.
For a detailed review of the various free-rider arguments see Overstreet, Resale Price Main-
tenance and the FTC: An Analysis of the Corning Glass Works Case, at 76-95 (FTC, 1985)
(mimeo).
20. Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) [hereinafter Klein & Leffler]. See also Klein, Crawford, Ampers
& Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Con-
tractual Reliability, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983); Shapiro, Consumer Information Product
Quality and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982); Shapiro, Premiums for High
Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q. J. EcoN. 659 (1983); and Smith & Dox,
The Pricing of Legal Services: A Contractual Solution to the Problem of Bilateral Oppor-
tunism, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 167 (1985).
21. For other products, generally not associated with a trademark, consumers can de-
termine quality prior to purchase at a low cost (e.g., fresh fruits or vegetables, lumber,
grains, etc.).
1987]
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itly or implicitly promised, then the consumer will continue to
purchase from the seller. On the other hand, if quality is deceptive,
consumers will cease to purchase from the deceptive firm. But, if
there is a return on deception (i.e., receipt of a high quality price
for a low quality/low cost product), each firm may have an incen-
tive to be deceptive. In equilibrium, the only producers that will
survive are those who produce low quality products whose quality
can be determined prior to purchase (i.e., are not deceptive). Con-
sumer information and enforcement costs limit the range of quality
products available.
However, a price premium over and above the costs of produc-
tion, including a normal profit, can create incentives for firms to
produce high quality products. These price premia represent the
return to brandname (trademark) capital investments. Trademark
investments take the form of specific capital investments. Specific
capital is defined as having a very low or zero salvage value (e.g.,
opportunity cost) in alternative uses. Thus, the returns (price
premia) to investments in brandname capital (trademarks) depend
on repeat sales. If future sales are not realized because the trade-
mark loses its reputational value (e.g., the firm is deceptive), then
the salvage value of the trademark capital will become very low or
zero.
Specific capital investments also signal information to con-
sumers on what firms have at stake if quality is deceptive. The
capital at risk can be interpreted as a "performance bond" that is
forfeited if future (repeat) sales are not realized.22 Specific capital
investments simultaneously serve to insure "market" performance
of quality assurance claims that would not be necessary in a world
of costless enforcement of quality claims. Besides brandname ad-
vertising, other forms of specific investments may be made, such as
luxurious storefronts, thick carpeting, and ornate displays and
signs, even if yielding little or no direct service flows to
consumers.2"
22. Note that the signal to consumers is the amount of specific trademark capital and
not the return (quality assurance premium) which would require the consumer to have
much more information, such as information on the costs of production. In a competitive
equilibrium, specific capital investments in the trademark equal the expected present value
of the price premia stream charged for quality products.
23. For example, the frequent use of noted personalities or entertainers in commercials
may be attributed to consumer perception of the high cost of these endorsements rather
than their being more effective in presenting advertisements. Pepsi Cola made no secret of
the fees paid for Michael Jackson commercials. Or alternatively, noted personalities have
[Vol. 19:1
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The price premium or specific quality assuring capital invest-
ments for any goods depends on a number of factors. 4 The more
frequently a product is purchased, the less quality assurance capi-
tal required, because consumers can discipline a deceptive seller
more quickly. Durable goods will require higher quality assurance
investments. Because the quality assurance argument is premised
on a market enforcement mechanism (rather than legal enforce-
ment through the courts) of implicit and explicit claims, the cost of
legal enforcement relative to the cost of nonperformance is impor-
tant. For example, the consequential damages that may be realized
by a defective drug may explain why low priced "generic" drugs,
despite legislation intended to promote them, have not been all
that successful against higher priced "brand" name drugs.2 The
decision to invest in trademark capital, similar to other invest-
ments, is a function of market conditions such as the interest rate.
Once investment decisions are made, trademark capital is subject
to the risk of changing market conditions. Finally, prices of trade-
mark goods and, therefore, the quality assurance premia, are lim-
ited by competition. If a price premium is charged in excess of the
premium necessary to deter (insure) deception (quality) by the
manufacturer, then competing trademarks will enter the market
and bid the price and premia down.
C. Free-Riding Off Manufacturers' Trademark Capital
Consider manufacturers or their wholly-owned subsidiaries
(e.g., TM registrant) who incur all specific investments in the
trademark and distribute directly to retailers on a competitive ba-
sis without restrictions. For example, brandname liquor manufac-
turers require retailers to make few, if any, specific investments.
Specific investments, in the form of brandname advertising, are
generally made by the liquor manufacturer or its trademark regis-
trant.26 The price premia for quality assurance, as defined above,
are assumed net of other price premia used to cover other distribu-
their own reputational value at stake if the product is deceptive and therefore more credible
to consumers. Finally, local advertisements often refer to other expensive advertisements
such as "as advertised on the Tonight Show" to indicate the "stock" of capital at risk. Klein
& Leffler, supra note 20, at 625.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 632, n. 18.
26. Retailer advertisements generally take the form of "price" or intrabrand competi-
tion advertising. See Part III B infra.
1987]
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tion costs. The total price premium or mark-up is often expressed
as a percentage of the manufacturer's suggested retail price. Part
of the mark-up will be used to cover the cost of such functions as
supplying shelf space or maintaining an inventory. The price
premia for these other functions are assumed to be competitively
determined in the market and not specific to the trademark. That
is, there are a large number of buyers (e.g., distributors) and sellers
(e.g., retailers) of shelf space. If the margin offered is not competi-
tive (e.g., does not cover the cost of shelf space), then a retailer will
turn to competitive buyers. The capital used in providing shelf
space has alternative uses; therefore, its value is not specific to the
reputational value of a trademark.2 7 Mark-ups may also be used to
compensate retailers for post-sale services such as the costs of han-
dling refunds or warranty repairs. The capital used in providing
such services may also be of a general nature (i.e., has alternative
uses) and not trademark specific. 8 In order to distinguish between
different types of potential free-riding, retailers are assumed to not
be in a position to free-ride off the manufacturer, distributor or
other retailers, or to not have incentives to be deceptive. For exam-
ple, assume the consumer has knowledge that if a product is defec-
tive, then he/she has the responsibility to return it to the manufac-
turer for refund or warranty repair.2 9 Free-riding, under these
assumptions, can only take the form of parallel sellers free-riding
off of manufacturers' specific investments in trademarks.
One free-rider argument advanced is that parallel import com-
petition reduces U.S. retail prices, thereby reducing price premia."
The manufacturers' prices, compared to retailers', must fall in or-
der to compete with the gray market because the price premium or
margin available for retailers is assumed to be competitively deter-
mined (e.g., shelf space). This, in turn, reduces the price premium
available for the manufacturer to cover specific investments in
27. This is not to say that the price of shelf space or the cost of inventory will be the
same for all retailers. For example, the cost of land is likely to be much higher in the central
business district than in out-lying areas. Thus, some retailers will have higher costs of capi-
tal and therefore a higher price premium. See Part III infra for a discussion of how Robin-
son-Patman may constrain the ability of a distributor to account for such differences.
28. For example, a major cost of refunds is the cost (interest rate) of capital. However,
warranty repairs may require specific human capital investments (specialized training asso-
ciated with a particular good) that cannot be transferred to other goods.
29. The costs of such services, of course, would be reflected in the price of goods to
retailers.
30. See LEXECON, supra note 18.
[Vol. 19:1
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trademark capital. 3' Accordingly, it is argued that parallel import-
ers receive the benefit of trademark capital without paying the
costs.
However, if gray market retailers sell at a lower retail price,
then they must either be more efficient compared to authorized
retailers or be able to purchase goods at a lower price than author-
ized retailers. Retail services are assumed to be competitively sup-
plied so that gray market retailers cannot be more efficient. If gray
market retailers were more efficient, they would be authorized re-
tailers.32 Therefore, parallel retailers must be able to purchase
trademark goods abroad at a lower price than the U.S. trademark
registrant charges authorized retailers in the United States. It is
argued that the lower price abroad is the result, inter alia, of the
rapid appreciation of the dollar in the 1980s."s
Support for this argument rests with the fact that parallel im-
ports and the dollar increased during the same period. 4 Tables 1
and 2 are used to illustrate the effects of a dollar appreciation. As-
sume a Japanese manufacturer charges $120/unit to a U.S. distrib-
utor and 120F (francs) to a French distributor, when the exchange
rates are $1=1F= I Y (yen). Further assume there is a forty per-
cent mark-up ($48 or 48F premium) required in each country to
provide a return to quality assurance investments."' Both distribu-
tors (i.e., trademark registrants) are assumed to be subsidiaries of
the manufacturer.36 The distributors' price to retailers is then $168
and 168F respectively. Retailers' costs (e.g., shelf space, etc.) are
31. Because trademark capital is specific, the manufacturer will not exit the market or
abandon the trademark unless the premia falls to zero. But, the manufacturer may have an
incentive to be deceptive if the premium falls.
32. But see Part III infra (discussion of Robinson-Patman constraints that can lead to
distributional inefficiencies in authorized distribution).
33. See LEXECON, supra note 18.
34. The parallel market in most cases began in the 1980s with the exception of cameras
which started in the 1970s. See D.O.C. supra note 14, at 3. The multilateral trade-weighted
real value of the U.S. dollar increased by about forty percent between 1980 and the fourth
quarter of 1984. ECONOWM REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 351 (1985).
35. The analysis abstracts from other distributor costs (e.g., inventory) which are as-
sumed to be competitively determined such that parallel importers must also incur these
costs.
36. If distributors are not subsidiaries, then it is assumed that the manufacturer would
charge each distributor $168 and 168F respectively with a distributor rebate of $48 or 48F
upon proof of quality assurance investments. In the United States, if the trademark regis-
trant is an independent entity, not controlled by the foreign manufacturer, then it is able to
prevent parallel imports under current U.S. Custom's regulations. 19 C.F.R.
§133.21(3)(1)(1985).
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assumed to be competitively determined at $24/unit and 24F/unit
respectively. It is assumed that a parallel seller must also spend
$24/unit to cover its costs. Parallel shipping costs from France to
the United States are assumed to be 11F. 7 Table 1 illustrates that
parallel imports are not feasible under these assumptions. A
French retailer will not sell to a parallel importer for less than
168F. If the parallel importer purchases the goods for 168F and
adds $24 for distribution costs and 1IF for shipping costs, then
total per unit costs equal $203, which exceeds the authorized U.S.
retail price ($192).
TABLE 1
Per Unit Prices and Costs
Prior to Dollar Appreciation
U.S. FRENCH DISTRIBUTOR
DISTRIBUTOR
U.S.
U.S. FRANCE PARALLEL MKT.
Manufacturers' Price $120 120F 120F
Quality Assurance Premium $ 48 48F 48F
Cost to Retailers $168 168F 168F
Retailers' Premium
to Cover Cost $ 24 24F $24
Shipping Costs - - 1F
Retail Price $192 192F 203F
Now consider the effect of a dollar appreciation. Table 2 is
identical to Table 1 except that it is now assumed that
$1=2F= 2Y. Competing foreign trademark goods will decrease the
manufacturer's price from $120 to $60 in the United States. It has
been argued, however, that as trademark investments are incurred
in the United States they are unaffected by a change in the ex-
change rate. Table 2 initially assumes that the U.S. quality assur-
ance premium remains constant at $48. Note, though, that the
quality assuring premium in France (expressed in dollars) is $24.
The net effect of the dollar appreciation is to increase relative re-
tailers' cost in the United States ($108) compared to France ($84).
37. It is assumed that the manufacturer's shipping costs from Japan to either market
are equal and included in the manufacturer's price to distributors.
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The U.S. premium as a percent of the manufacturer's price in-
creases from 40%, prior to the dollar appreciation, to 80%, after
the dollar appreciation. Retailers' premium of $24 for other func-
tions is assumed to remain unchanged, whether sold in the U.S.
authorized market or U.S. parallel market.
Table 2 illustrates that French retailers now have an incentive
to sell in the U.S. parallel market. The U.S. authorized retail price
(absent competition from parallel distribution) is $132. But a par-
allel importer could purchase goods at $84 from French retailers
and add its distribution cost of $24 plus shipping cost of $5.50 for
a total marginal cost of $113.50. A per unit profit of $18.50 is possi-
ble at a U.S. retail price of $132.38 However, competition from par-
allel importers will eventually decrease the U.S. retail price from
$132 to $113.50 (i.e., by $18.50), which is the marginal cost of par-
allel importers.
Because it is assumed that the U.S. retailers' premiums are
competitively determined, the manufacturer or the U.S. trademark
registrant will be required to decrease its price to U.S. retailers
from $108 to $89.50 ($108 - $18.50) in order to remain
competitive.3 9
TABLE 2
Per Unit Prices and Costs
After Dollar Appreciation
U.S. FRENCH DISTRIBUTOR
DISTRIBUTOR
U.S.
U.S. FRANCE PARALLEL MKT.
Manufacturers' Price $60 120F($60) 120F($60)
Quality Assurance Premium $48 48F($24) 48F($24)
Cost to Retailers $108 168F($84) 168F($84)
Retailers' Premium
to Cover Cost $24 24F($12) ($24)
Shipping Costs - - 11F($5.50)
Retail Price $132 192F($96) $113.50
38. The French retailer will obviously want some return for supplying the parallel mar-
ket; therefore, the price will be higher. The analysis abstracts from how the gains from
parallel imports are distributed (e.g., the French retailer and parallel importer could be a
joint venture).
39. That is, parallel importers have a competitive cost advantage of $18.50 so that the
U.S. distributor's price to U.S. retailers must be reduced by $18.50 ($108 - $89.50) to permit
its retailers to sell for a retail price of $113.50.
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The Japanese manufacturer will not adjust its price because it is
able to profitably sell to the French distributor and other distribu-
tors for 120F ($60).40 Therefore, the U.S. quality assurance pre-
mium must fall from $48 to $29.50. The equilibrium result under
these assumptions is that quality assurance premia across coun-
tries (expressed in dollars) will differ only by shipping costs. The
net effect of the parallel market is that the value of the U.S. trade-
mark (capitalized quality assurance premium) expressed in dollars
will fall.41 In summary, parallel importers receive the benefits of
U.S. trademark capital without paying the full costs because they
are not charged the full U.S. quality assurance premium (i.e., qual-
ity assurance premium in France is $24 versus $48 in the United
States).
This free-rider result is conditioned on the assumption that
the U.S. quality assurance premium is invariant to a change in the
exchange rate because trademark capital investments are incurred
in the United States. This assumption requires further examina-
tion. Recall from Section B that specific trademark capital pro-
vides a signal to consumers of what manufacturers have at stake, if
quality is deceptive. The value of trademarks under these assump-
tions represent the capitalized (present value) value of future qual-
ity assurance premia. A lower premium, and therefore lower future
quality assurance investments due to parallel competition, may be
argued to be perceived by consumers as a lower quality product or
an increased likelihood of deceptive quality. Thus, consumer per-
ceptions may lead to decreases in the demand for foreign trade-
mark goods.
There are, however, several factors that suggest the quality as-
surance premium should adjust to a change in the exchange rate.
First, a dollar appreciation will lower the price of foreign trade-
mark goods. For example, in Table 2, the U.S. retail price will fall
from $192 to $132 even without parallel competition. The in-
creased quantity sold at a lower price will generate increased qual-
40. It is assumed that manufacturers have constant costs. This assumption is not criti-
cal. If manufacturer costs increase, then both U.S. and French retailers will pay a higher
price, which in turn will mean a higher price to parallel importers. Therefore, there should
be no comparative advantage to parallel importers, regardless of whether manufacturer
costs increase or decrease with an expansion in output.
41. If the dollar appreciation or parallel imports is expected to be permanent, then the
fall in the trademark capital value will be significant. On the other hand, if the dollar appre-
ciation is expected to be temporary, there will be a short run capital loss with the value in
the long run returning to a pre-dollar appreciation level as the dollar depreciates.
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ity assurance premium revenues. The quality assurance premium/
unit multiplied by the quantity sold represents a return on trade-
mark capital. Thus, for any given stock of U.S. trademark capital,
the return to capital will increase with a dollar appreciation and a
constant quality assurance premium/unit. In a competitive market,
the quality assurance premium can be expected to be reduced (i.e.,
by way of a decrease in price) to a normal return on trademark
capital.
Second, the accumulated trademark capital is still at risk even
though the return to the capital may be reduced by parallel com-
petition. Thus, unless the accumulated trademark capital depreci-
ates at a very rapid rate, consumer perceptions are not likely to be
affected in the short run. Only future investments in trademark
capital are affected. Moreover, at the lower prices brought by the
dollar appreciation, if quality is deceptive consumers have less at
risk. Thus, as the price of a good falls, all other things equal, less
specific capital should be required as an indirect performance
bond. For example, the quality assurance premiums or revenues
were assumed to be forty percent of the manufacturer's price (or
revenues) in Table 1 and increased to eighty percent of the manu-
facturer's price in Table 2, if the premium does not fall even with
quantity demanded constant. Thus, if consumer demand for spe-
cific investments falls with a decrease in the retail price, competi-
tive pressures will reduce the quality assurance premiums.
Third, related to the above, a dollar appreciation results in a
comparative price advantage of foreign goods compared to domes-
tic goods. Fewer interbrand advertising expenditures are necessary
by foreign manufacturers to compete against U.S. domestic manu-
facturers with a price advantage."2 Moreover, domestic manufac-
turers subjected to increased price competition by foreign manu-
facturers will also experience a decrease in the price premiums
available for quality assurance. Thus, the overall level of inter-
brand advertising may fall because of a change in the exchange
rate.
In summary, there is no a priori reason to expect quality as-
surance premiums. Therefore, the value of accumulated specific
capital and future investments may be unaffected by exchange rate
42. Part III B infra examines interbrand versus intrabrand competition in more detail.
For the purposes of this discussion assume quality assurance is a proxy for interbrand
competition.
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movements even though these expenditures are incurred in the
United States. Whether the quality assurance premiums falls, in
proportion to a change in the exchange rate, or in a lesser or
greater proportion to the exchange rate, is an empirical question."
However, it is reasonable to assume that there would be decreased
premia in a competitive market. If the competitive premiums falls
in proportion to the exchange rate, then parallel importers can
have no cost advantage. For example, if the U.S. premium de-
creases to $24 or more in Table 2, then the price to U.S. retailers
would be the same or less than the price parallel importers must
pay. On the other hand, if the competitive premiums decrease is
less than proportionate to the exchange rate, then parallel import-
ers can have a cost advantage. In this case, parallel importers free-
ride off U.S. accumulated trademark capital by not being charged
the full U.S. competitive premium.44 The lower premium will also
result in fewer future trademark investments that can affect future
demand for foreign trademark goods.
Now consider the quality assurance premiums as a deterrent
to prevent manufacturers from being deceptive. It is assumed that
the dollar appreciates against the manufacturer's currency (yen) in
the same proportion to the franc, such that 2Y=2F=$1. If the
U.S. premium of $48 were maintained by restricting parallel im-
ports, then the yen value would be 96Y in the United States and
48Y in France. 4" In this case, the value of the U.S. trademark, ex-
pressed in the manufacturer's currency, doubles and represents a
windfall gain.46 Therefore, as long as the percentage decrease in
43. Presumably, the level of specific investments is determined empirically through
trial and error. See infra Part III C for a more detailed discussion of marketing and inter-
brand competition.
44. More precisely, the competitive U.S. premium may be less than proportionate to
the exchange rate by the amount of shipping costs incurred by parallel importers. For exam-
ple, in Table 2, the U.S. premium could be $29, instead of a proportionate $24, without
giving the parallel importer a cost advantage.
45. If there were no shipping costs in the above example, the quality assurance pre-
mium expressed in francs would be constant between countries. The shipping cost margin
prevents a fall that equalizes the premium across countries such that there is a gain in the
trademark value in the United States relative to France (expressed in francs). The above
analysis also abstracts from the increased quantity sold in the United States as a result of a
dollar appreciation. The return to trademark capital is the per unit premium times the
quantity sold.
46. The analysis abstracts from underlying changes between countries that may have
precipitated the change in the exchange rate. For example, increased inflation in France
may cause the dollar to appreciate. In this case, the purchasing power of the franc changes,
thereby lowering the real value of the U.S. trademark expressed in francs. Consideration of
these factors is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the U.S. quality assurance revenue is less than or equal to the per-
centage increase in the dollar appreciation, the foreign manufac-
turer will continue to have an incentive to manufacture quality
goods. The foreign manufacturer has at least the same specific cap-
ital (expressed in yen) at risk if quality is deceptive under the new
equilibrium. Therefore, parallel competition that comes into exis-
tence because U.S. premiums are fixed can be interpreted as an
efficient market adjustment to the amount the foreign manufac-
turer has at stake if quality is deceptive. "7
The overall effect of parallel competition may simply be a
movement down the demand curve as opposed to a shift in the
demand curve. Parallel competition, as a result of a dollar appreci-
ation that forces market adjustments in price premia revenues, is
not necessarily free-riding off the U.S. trademark. As a general
rule, under these assumptions, free-riding by the parallel importer
can only occur when U.S. authorized distribution expenditures are
independent of the exchange rate and the parallel importer is able
to avoid some of these dollar expenditures. 8 The above analysis
has focused on quality assurance premiums that under reasonable
assumptions should decrease with dollar appreciation. The U.S.
distributor incurs other costs in distribution related to a number of
functions, such as maintaining an inventory and other transactions
costs.4 9 But, parallel importers may also incur these costs.
The adjustment factors enumerated above are premised on an
assumption that in a competitive market the quality assurance
premiums in the United States would adjust with a change in the
exchange rate, such that the competitive price will be lower. 50 For
47. Similarly, if the dollar should depreciate against the yen (e.g., $2=1Y), then a
higher quality assurance premium expressed in dollars would be required to maintain the
same specific capita] at risk expressed in yen.
48. Foreign distributors receive a premium on units sold in the U.S. parallel market
without incurring the expense for quality assurance. For example, in Table 2 infra the
French distributor receives 48F ($24/unit) on the additional sales to the parallel market
without the necessity of making quality assurance investments in France. Therefore, the
foreign distributor receives a higher return on its trademark capital. Assuming both distrib-
utors are subsidiaries of the foreign manufacturer, the lower return on U.S. trademark capi-
tal (expressed in dollars) is partially offset by the increased return on trademark capital in
France. Therefore, the U.S. distributor should receive a credit on gray market sales. The net
effect on revenues will depend on demand elasticities in both countries and manufacturing
costs.
49. The same analysis can be applied to the provision of services by the manufacturer
or distributor. For example, less capital in dollars is required for inventory, refunds and
replacements if the cost of goods fall due to a dollar appreciation.
50. If the quality assurance premium is a fixed proportion of manufacturer's price, the
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example, consider the Japanese manufacturer who after the dollar
appreciation receives 96Y/unit return from its U.S. trademark cap-
ital and only 48Y/unit return from its trademark capital in France.
Japan will increase its shipments to the United States, thereby re-
ducing the U.S. retail price because the returns (expressed in yen)
to its trademark capital are higher in the United States relative to
France. Competition among foreign manufacturers will eventually
force the U.S. price down to where the returns to trademark capi-
tal in various countries are equal.5 Therefore, manufacturers who
do not adjust U.S. prices, and therefore quality assurance premi-
ums, will be subject to competition from other manufacturers who
do adjust. Parallel importers, of course, are competitors. But U.S.
trademark registrants could simply decrease their price to U.S. re-
tailers in the first instance, thereby eliminating the price differ-
ences between countries and the parallel market. There are several
possible explanations that may explain price rigidity. First, the
competitive market assumption is not valid such that inflexible
price premiums represent a form of price discrimination. It should
be noted that price discrimination requires market power and the
ability to restrict resale. These points are discussed in Part III A.
Second, there is an economic justification for inflexible price pre-
miums or premiums that do not adjust in proportion to the change
in the exchange rate."2 If price premiums are required to be rigid
competitive retail price would be $108, which is equal to the price in France except for the
higher U.S. premium to cover U.S. retailer costs as illustrated in Table 2 supra. A parallel
market would not develop. On the other hand, if the quality assurance premium is not pro-
portional to the manufacturer's price, then the competitive retail price may be lower or
higher than $108. If the competitive premium falls to $29, which is more than proportionate
to the percentage change in the exchange rate, then there is still no opportunity for a paral-
lel market because of shipping costs of $5.50.
51. Equal returns do not necessarily imply equal specific capital investments. Whether
the U.S. per unit quality assurance premium is greater than, equal to, or less than foreign
premiums will depend on inter alia the productivity of specific capital, demand elasticities
and the extent of the market in various countries.
52. It can be argued that there are certain promotional expenses that do not adjust
with the exchange rate. For example, wages or salaries in the form of salesmen or point of
sales demonstrations in the United States are not likely to adjust with an exchange rate
change. Offsetting these costs are the increased premium revenues from increased sales and
the likelihood of less interbrand competition and more price competition due to the dollar
appreciation. Finally, it is important to distinguish the portion of the quality assurance pre-
mium attributed as a return to accumulated trademark capital (stock) versus a return for
future investments in the trademark (flow). Accumulated investments (the stock) in specific
capital are a sunk cost. As discussed above, the quality assurance premium can be reduced
in U.S. dollars and still provide a market return in yen. If the quality assurance premium is
mostly a return on accumulated investments, then parallel competition will have little effect
on demand. It is only that portion of the premium devoted to future investments that is
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in the United States, then parallel importers do free-ride off the
required higher premium in the United States since their price in-
corporates a lower premium changed in the foreign country."'
Third, price rigidity may exist at the retail level when vertical re-
straints are introduced. In this case, manufacturers may supply the
parallel market to avoid losing sales to other competitors or new
entrants. The following section drops the assumption of competi-
tion at the retail level and introduces vertical restraints.
D. Vertical Restraints and Free-Riding
The preceding discussion assumed that the manufacturer or its
subsidiary provided quality assurance and other services subject to
free-rider concerns. Retailers simply sold the product with selling
costs being competitively determined. Under these assumptions, it
is not possible to free-ride off of U.S. retailers. However, marketing
and the provision of services may be more effective when per-
formed by firms closer to consumers. Some optimal mix of expend-
itures on marketing and services incurred by retailers, jobbers,
wholesalers and distributors is likely to result. A gray market could
not exist if distribution is totally integrated from the manufactur-
ing level down to the retail level.54 There are reasons discussed in
the literature, however, as to why vertical integration may be
critical. For reasons discussed, future investments are likely to be reduced even in the ab-
sence of a gray market, as long as the dollar remains strong.
53. The above analysis assumes that the quality assurance premium is equal across
countries. There is no inherent reason why quality assurance premiums or specific capital
investments should be equal in different countries. For example, quality assurance invest-
ments are likely to have differential returns across countries because the determinants of
quality assurance differ (e.g., laws, enforcement, interest rates, etc.). Parallel competition in
this case would represent free-riding. That is, the parallel importer receives the benefit of
larger U.S. quality assurance investments because of the lower premium charged in foreign
countries. But presumably these differences existed prior to the 1980s. Shipping costs in-
curred by parallel importers could provide a separation of markets to permit differential
margins as long as the margins are less than or equal to shipping costs. But shipping costs
appear to represent a small percentage (e.g., 1%) of the retail price. See LEXECON supra
note 18. The dollar appreciation, given the above assumptions, should not effect the differ-
ential if U.S. margins adjust. Thus, differential investments can not explain the emergence
of the gray market in the 1980s unless whatever separated the market prior to the 1980s is
also affected by a change in the exchange rate.
54. It is possible that a gray market importer's source of goods could come from
purchases by foreign consumers who in turn sell to the gray market. However, the transac-
tion costs of such a source would seem to be greater than any price premium differential.
Moreover, absent price discrimination, the foreign price premium would be reflected in the
consumer's price which in turn would be incorporated in the gray market importer's price.
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inefficient."'
There is no evidence on the ownership forms of authorized re-
tailers who are subject to gray market competition. Common ob-
servation indicates that for many of the products listed in Part I
(e.g., perfumes, watches, cameras) the authorized retailers are in-
dependently owned entities. The U.S. trademark registrant may
enter into variety of agreements with retailers, jobbers, wholesalers
and regional distributors ranging from terms that provide exclusive
territories, location clauses, purchase requirements, required in-
ventories to no restrictions, such as assumed above."6 Some type of
vertical restraint is necessary if independent firms are expected to
invest in quality assurance or provide services.
The purpose of vertical restraints is to restrict intrabrand
competition in order to maintain price margins, thereby creating
incentives for retailers to invest in quality assurance or the provi-
sion of services. The most common vertical restraints are exclusive
territories (ET) and resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements.57
Explicit RPM agreements are now per se illegal under antitrust
laws.5 ETs have been examined under a rule of reason since Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 9
55. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Rubin, The Expan-
sion of Firms, 81 J. POt. ECON. 936 (1973); Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Struc-
ture of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978). See also Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am- ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
56. The analysis in Section C assumed there were no agreements between manufactur-
ers and retailers other than that of a sale of the goods to retailers in a competitive market
without restrictions (i.e., intrabrand competition at the retail level). For sake of simplicity,
the following analysis assumes all transactions are between the United States trademark
registrant and retailers with no middlemen. This assumption does not effect the analysis.
Part III B introduces different levels of distribution.
57. See OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONoMic THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE, (1983 photo. reprint); Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance and the FTC: An
Analysis of the Corning Glass Works Case, FTC (1985)(mimeo). See also Easterbrook, Re-
stricted Dealing Is a Way to Compete, REG., (Jan./Feb. 1984). The Supreme Court in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) held RPM agreements to
be per se illegal.
58. RPM agreements were permitted under the Miller-Tydings Act (1937) and ex-
tended to nonsigners under the McGuire Act (1952). Both Acts were judicially repealed in
1975. In the Matter of Corning Glass Works, 85 F.T.C. 1061 (1975).
59. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Technically, courts are to balance the increase in interbrand
competition against the decrease in intrabrand competition. Vertical restraints, however,
have been attacked on grounds other than antitrust, such as unconscionability, unfair bar-
gaining and penalty clauses. State franchise relation/disclosure statutes and regulations also
impose constraints on vertical restraint agreements. Thus the prevention of free-riding off
the services of others is not just a matter of contract. The terms of these agreements and
their enforcement are subject to constraints imposed by antitrust law, common law princi-
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Retailers will agree to invest in specific trademark capital only
if some assurance is provided that they will receive a return on
their investments. The manufacturer will want to set a retail price
that maximizes its profit given its costs, including a return on spe-
cific investments. While RPM agreements are illegal, most trade-
mark goods have manufacturer suggested retail prices. Thus, the
manufacturer, through a suggested retail price and the price it
charges retailers, can control the margin available for retailers. In
conjunction with setting the price margin, the manufacturer may
grant exclusive territories to prevent an erosion of retailer price
margins by intrabrand competition. However, the manufacturer is
in a position to act opportunistically by reducing the manufactur-
ers' suggested retail prices or increasing the price to retailers once
retailers have made specific investments in the trademark. Given
the potential for opportunistic behavior, retailers will want assur-
ances that their margins will be maintained. Margins are likely to
be contractually determined with very little flexibility.
Retailers may also engage in opportunistic behavior. Exclusive
territories, created by restricting intrabrand competition, are one
means to prevent one retailer from free-riding off the quality as-
surance investments or services of other retailers. Suggested manu-
facturer retail prices and therefore price premia are maintained by
restricting intrabrand competition. Moreover, retailers' price
premia and their specific capital investments serve an additional
function beyond providing quality assurance to consumers. Re-
tailer investments also serve as a means by which the distributor
can enforce its vertical restraint agreements. For example, a re-
tailer will weigh the benefits of free-riding (e.g., failure to adver-
tise, failure to provide services or failure to maintain suggested re-
tail price as explicitly or implicitly agreed) against the cost of
termination resulting in a forfeiture of future premia required to
ples and state statutes and regulations. Despite these constraints, the amount of unautho-
rized selling (i.e., domestic gray markets) when transactions are confined within the U.S. is
relatively small compared to gray market imports. See Klein, Transaction Cost Determi-
nants of 'Unfair' Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356 (1980); Klein & Saft,
The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & ECON. 345 (1985). Eigh-
teen states have general disclosure laws. Fourteen states require registration. In some states
(e.g., California) the registration is modeled after Blue Sky Laws (e.g., merit regulation).
Twenty-two states have business opportunity disclosure statutes. Bus. Franchise Guide,
(CCH) 11 2001 (1985). Twenty states regulate terms such as termination clauses, purchasing
requirements, discrimination, kickbacks, conduct standards, good faith dealing, repurchase/
compensation, misuse of franchise fees and exclusive territory. Bus. Franchise Guide, (CCH)
2003 (1983). IBM has apparently had problems with gray market sales domestically.
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cover specific investments.
Parallel distribution will occur if vertical restraints in the
United States and foreign countries are too costly to monitor or
enforce. For example, assume the $24 retailer's premium in Table
1 is now a return to retailers' specific capital investments, rather
than a premium to cover competitively determined costs, such as
shelf space as previously assumed. The following analysis abstracts
from other costs incurred at the retail level assumed to be competi-
tively determined. If the French retailer sells in the parallel mar-
ket (breaches its vertical restraint agreement), then it is subject to
termination and forfeiture of the $24/unit premium stream. The
maximum per unit profit possible from the parallel market is $13
($192-$168-$11). The parallel market is able to free-ride off of U.S.
retailer investment in trademark capital by having a cost advan-
tage. However, foreign retailer losses from termination ($24) ex-
ceed the gains ($13) from supplying the parallel market. Moreover,
even if it were costly for the distributor to detect a breach of con-
tract, a relatively small probability of being detected will result in
a significant expected loss to a retailer."0 In addition, the initial
gains from selling in the parallel market decrease with increased
parallel competition and therefore a lower U.S. price.
The parallel market can then be explained as either the U.S.
distributor failing to adjust to a change in the exchange rate, as
discussed in Section C, or the unenforceability of vertical re-
straints. As noted, vertical restraints in the United States are gen-
erally enforceable. However, certain aspects of foreign laws are in
effect pre-Sylvania. Export restrictions are generally per se illegal
in the European Economic Community and other countries. Sec-
ond, a recent case decided by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities held that a manufacturer cannot deny a guarantee
on parallel sales if guarantees are supplied on authorized sales."'
Third, another recent case restricts exclusive territories in
franchise agreements.6 2 Fourth, some countries have compulsory li-
censing laws that may restrict the terms of a vertical restraint.
60. The loss from termination is the specific capital invested, which is assumed to re-
present the present value of future price premia. On the other hand, the gains from selling
in the parallel market will last only as long as the dollar is strong.
61. Swiss Watch Maker May Not Discriminate Among Distributors in Offering Guar-
antee, 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 263 (1986).
62. The Court of Justice has recently ruled on a franchise agreement that divides the
market. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH. Frankfurt v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis
Hamburg, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 161/84.
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Table 1 can now be reinterpreted to consider the effect of the
unenforceability of export restrictions in foreign countries. Assume
the foreign manufacturer has subsidiaries in all Member States of
the European Community and each of these distributors faces
prices and margins identical to those illustrated in Table 1. As-
sume initially that both the United States and Member States of
the European Community enforce vertical restraints. Retailers in
all countries received a $24 premium for specific trademark invest-
ments.6  If export restrictions now become illegal (i.e., vertical re-
straints unenforceable), then parallel markets will develop in each
of the Member States. For example, German or Italian retailers
will sell in the French parallel market. If French retailers maintain
their retail price of 192F, that includes the 24F quality assurance
premium, then German or Italian retailers can free-ride off of
French retailers' investments by selling at a price below 192F in
the French parallel market. That is, German or Italian retailers
can now sell outside of their exclusive territories and increase their
sales by charging a lower price that does not include a premium for
specific investments.
With parallel competition in France, the new equilibrium price
will be 168F (192F - 24F) which is equal to the parallel seller's
marginal cost. A similar argument can be made for French retailers
selling in the German and Italian parallel market. The European
retail price will fall to 168F or the equivalent exchange price in
each country and the value of retailers' trademark capital in all
European countries trademark will fall to zero since there is no
return (price premium) that can be charged to recover investment
costs with parallel distribution in all Member States.
Retailers in Member States, also, have an incentive to sell in
the U.S. parallel market. A maximum profit of $13/unit ($192-
$168-$11) can be realized by parallel importers if the U.S. price
remains at $192. However, the price will fall to $179 which is the
marginal cost to parallel importers ($168 + $11 shipping costs)
with parallel competition in the United States. The $13 U.S. price
decline must come at the expense of either a reduced U.S. trade-
63. The analysis abstracts from other retailer costs such as shelf space. Because these
costs are competitively determined and free-riding is not possible, ignoring these costs does
not effect the analysis since the parallel importer can have no cost advantage over the au-
thorized retailers in the United States. The retailers' premiums can also be interpreted as
simply a margin that is forfeited if the retailer fails to perform services. The margin is
assumed to be less than the costs required by the distributor to monitor performance, and
thus represents an efficient performance bond and not a competitive return.
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mark registrant's premium or a reduced U.S. retailer's premium or
both. The inability to enforce foreign vertical restraints, coupled
with the ability of parallel importers to free-ride off of U.S. retail-
ers' quality assurance premiums, may explain the gray market even
in the absence of a dollar appreciation. In this case, either the for-
eign manufacturer, U.S. trademark registrant, or U.S. retailers will
experience a loss in trademark value. In the long run, consumers in
the United States lose if foreign trademark goods are no longer
able to command a premium. The losses are a result of the parallel
market free-riding off of U.S. investments which will ultimately ef-
fect U.S. supply and demand of foreign trademark goods.
The foregoing analysis ignores any adjustment made by the
manufacturer to the change in foreign law. The optimal level of
quality assurance premiums prior to the change in foreign law was
assumed to be $48 at the distributor's level and $24 at the retail
level (Table 1). However, this level is based on an assumption that
vertical restraints are enforceable. If free-riding occurs at the retail
level, then manufacturers will have incentives to shift quality as-
surance investments to a level where free-riding is not possible.
For example, if foreign retailers are charged a price of 182F instead
of 168F, there will be no return to foreign retailers from selling in
the U.S. parallel market."4 The additional 14F price increase to
foreign retailers serves to eliminate parallel distribution. The in-
crease in foreign distributors' quality assurance premium permits
increased trademark investments at the distributor level to com-
pensate for the loss of investments or services at the retail level.65
Now consider the effects of a dollar appreciation. If U.S. re-
tailers are required to make specific investments in the trademark,
they will then require assurances from the manufacturer or trade-
mark registrant that the absolute premium will not change as
noted earlier. In addition, the duration of these agreements are
likely to extend over a long period in order to recoup specific capi-
tal investment costs. Therefore, retailer margins (returns) are
64. If parallel importer shipping costs to Member States were also $11, there would be
no parallel market in the European Community at a $182 cost to retailers. That is, $182 +
$11 shipping cost equals $193, which is greater than the authorized price of $192.
65. The level at which quality assurance and service expenditures are made will effect
the optimal level of trademark capital investments. Quality assurance investments in foreign
countries are likely to be less than the United States because of the loss of effectiveness due
to the absence of vertical restraints. However, as long as the differential does not exceed
parallel shipping costs, there will be no incentive for a gray market to develop.
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likely to be inflexible.6" Implicit or explicit agreements between the
U.S. trademark registrant and U.S. retailers would imply that ei-
ther the manufacturer or its subsidiary (i.e., U.S. trademark regis-
trant) will bear the full impact of the fall in the U.S. price brought
about by parallel imports.
Consider Table 2. Assume that the U.S. distributors' premium
of $48 and the retailer premium of $24 should adjust to $24 and
$12 respectively in a competitive equilibrium after a dollar appre-
ciation (i.e., a proportional adjustment). The price in the United
States should be equal to the price in France ($96) as illustrated in
Table 2. Also assume, as discussed above, that because vertical re-
straints are unenforceable in foreign countries, the $12 retailers'
premium, illustrated in Table 2, is now incorporated in the distrib-
utor price making the cost of $96 for foreign retailers. The total
cost to the parallel distributor is $96, plus shipping costs of $5.50
or $101.50. The total U.S. retailers' cost is $132 if both price mar-
gins in the United States do not adjust with the dollar apprecia-
tion. Assuming that other selling costs are competitively deter-
mined and equal for both the U.S. parallel importer and U.S.
retailers, the parallel market has a cost advantage of $31.50 ($132-
$101.50) after a dollar appreciation with fixed U.S. margins. With
parallel distribution, the competitive price in the United States
must fall by $31.50, which means that retailers' marginal cost in
the United States must equal parallel importers' marginal cost of
$101.50.
However, if U.S. retailers' premiums of $24 are contractually
determined, the manufacturer or U.S. trademark registrant must
absorb the $31.50 cost difference, thus allowing U.S. retailers to
remain competitive with parallel importers. Unlike the previous
analysis in Section C, the manufacturer and/or U.S. trademark
registrant now suffers a loss on trademark capital even when mea-
sured in yen. The dollar appreciation under a competitive equilib-
rium should lead to a $24 reduction in the distributor's premium
($48 - $24), and the value of the trademark as measured in yen
would remain unchanged. But, a $31.50 reduction in the U.S.
trademark registrant's premium results in a net premium of only
$16.50 or a net loss of $7.50 over the competitive premium of $24.
The risk of loss and who bears the loss are normally incorporated
into agreements which, in turn, are incorporated in prices. How-
66. This would likely be true in foreign countries if export restrictions were enforceable.
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ever, the magnitude and duration of the strong dollar in the 1980s
may not have been fully anticipated at the time vertical restraint
agreements were negotiated in the United States. If the assump-
tion that margins should adjust to exchange rates is correct, an un-
anticipated dollar appreciation results in overinvestment in U.S.
trademark capital ex post by retailers.6 7
The manufacturer or U.S. trademark registrant has three op-
tions. First, the parallel market can be avoided if the manufacturer
or U.S. trademark registrant maintains U.S. retailer margins and
absorbs the loss on its margin; this will result in an immediate loss
in value of the trademark as measured in yen but avoids any loss
by U.S. retailers. Second, the manufacturer or U.S. trademark reg-
istrant may maintain its margin at $24 and U.S. retailer margins at
$24 by setting a manufacturer's suggested retail price of $108.
Even if parallel imports could be prohibited, the manufacturer who
establishes a suggested retail price is likely to lose sales to other
competitors who may have more flexible margins. Maintaining the
distributors' or retailers' margin, and therefore the retail price,
above the competitive level will result in losses of sales that are
likely to reduce returns to both the foreign manufacturer and U.S.
authorized retailers.
Finally, the manufacturer or its subsidiary may implicitly or
explicitly sanction the parallel market. Parallel sales represent rev-
enues to the manufacturer. Parallel competition will indirectly re-
duce authorized retailer margins even though it will appear that
the manufacturer or U.S. trademark registrant is not breaching its
contract with retailers." For example, if foreign retailer premiums
67. Note the effect of the exchange rate. The manufacturer will perceive a fixed distrib-
utor premium as a higher return (in yen) on U.S. trademark capital and will accordingly
increase shipment to the U.S., thereby lowering the price. However, U.S. retailers measure
their return in dollars and not in yen. Thus, unlike foreign manufacturers, U.S. retailers are
exposed to the risk of exchange rate changes that cannot be internalized by a foreign
currency.
68. The policy implication of this argument is that manufacturers would not want to
"ban" the parallel market. Assume, however, that trademarks cannot be instantly produced
such that there is a natural restriction on entry in the short run. It can be argued in this
case that a ban may be favored as a means for foreign manufacturers to implicitly collude so
that contractual margins are maintained in the United States. A squeeze on U.S. retailer
margins from parallel imports affects the reputation of manufacturers not only with their
current retailers but with future retailers as well. Thus, competition among foreign manu-
facturers could still occur, but a ban may prevent competition from eroding contractually
determined retailer margins. In this light, the unanticipated event may not only have been
the exchange rate, but also the change in foreign law that enables parallel importers to
receive goods. This result, however, is still inefficient in the sense that there has been an
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are shifted to the distributor level, parallel importers' cost would
be $96 plus $5.50 in freight for a total cost of $101.50 (Table 2).
Even if the U.S. distributors adjust their margin to $24, then the
cost to U.S. retailers is $84. The U.S. authorized retailer will only
receive a $17.50 ($101.50 - $84) premium at a competitive price of
$101.50 set by the parallel importers' marginal cost. Thus, there is
an indirect adjustment from $24 to $17.50 or a loss of $6.50/unit to
U.S. retailers.
Each of these options has a cost to the manufacturer. The first
option results in a lower return on its specific investment, causing
a loss of trademark wealth but not a loss of sales. The second op-
tion represents a loss of sales revenues to the manufacturer and
U.S. authorized retailers in favor of competitors with more flexible
margins. The third option can be interpreted as a means of shifting
the unanticipated loss of a dollar appreciation from manufacturers
or U.S. trademark registrants to U.S. retailers.
The reduced premium to U.S. retailers will not cause them to
exit the market provided some return is earned on their invest-
ments. A zero return is realized if they exist. " There is a cost to
the manufacturer, however, of sanctioning the parallel market.
Even if U.S. retailers fail to recognize the indirect adjustment, they
will have less trust in continuous dealings with foreign trademarks.
The risk of loss will also effect the ability of the U.S. trademark
registrant to attract new retailers. The manufacturer will weigh
this cost against the immediate cost of absorbing the loss. Under
these assumptions, the long run consequences are likely to be more
flexible vertical restraint agreements and/or risk premiums to com-
pensate for exchange rate changes.
In summary, the parallel market, under these assumptions,
may be a market adjustment to an over-investment by U.S. retail-
ers in trademark capital due to an unanticipated dollar apprecia-
tion.70 United States retailers receive a lower return (premium) on
their capital as long as the dollar remains strong. Unlike the analy-
sis in Section C, U.S. retailers suffer real losses that are not inter-
overinvestment in trademark capital in light of the new exchange rate and that prices would
be artificially high under a ban. See Part III B (discussion of a manufacturer sanctioned
gray market).
69. It is interesting to note that the 1985 Department of Commerce study made no
mention of U.S. trademark registrants losing retailers. See D.O.C., supra note 14.
70. Of course, if U.S. retailers anticipated the effect of the dollar appreciation at the
time vertical restraints were negotiated, then the analysis is not applicable,
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nalized by a conversion of the premium to a foreign currency."
However, the parallel market may be indirectly sanctioned by
manufacturers as a means to minimize their losses and achieve
lower retailer margins in the U.S. in order to remain competitive in
the market. Parallel importers, under these assumptions, are not
free-riding off U.S. sellers as they pay prices that include all free-
ridable expenditures. United States consumers benefit from lower
prices.7 2
E. Lower Quality Products and Service
The analysis in Sections C and D require a number of restric-
tive assumptions. Under certain assumptions, the parallel market
enhances economic welfare if U.S. prices and U.S. price margins
are reduced, even though the dollar value of the U.S. trademarks is
reduced. A key assumption for this result is that quality assurance
premiums should adjust to the dollar appreciation in a competitive
equilibrium. On the other hand, if these premiums are assumed
not to adjust in a competitive equilibrium, then the parallel mar-
ket is not welfare enhancing. In this case, parallel competition
causes a shift in U.S. demand for foreign trademark goods by con-
straining U.S. quality assurance investments to lower levels deter-
mined in other countries (markets).
Another critical assumption has been that U.S. consumers re-
ceive the same goods and services in the gray market that they
receive from authorized sellers. This assumption means there is no
consumer deception and therefore the "reputational" value, as dis-
71. Note that if the U.S. trademark registrant is not a wholly owned subsidiary of the
foreign manufacturer, then U.S. shareholders in the U.S. trademark will realize a real loss in
the same manner as U.S. retailers. Thus, it may be U.S. shareholders that favor a ban on
parallel imports. While there is evidence that most U.S. trademark registrants are subsidiar-
ies of the foreign manufacturer, this is no evidence of the stock ownership in terms of na-
tionalities. Or alternatively, the foreign manufacturer may be owned by U.S. shareholders
whereby the reduced premium is not internalized by a foreign currency since dividends
must be paid in dollars. Thus, the composition of shareholders in multinational firms may
effect the pricing decisions of these firms. For example, wholly owned subsidiaries are likely
to force premiums (prices) down for those firms partially owned by U.S. citizens. Of course,
if the dollar appreciation is anticipated ex ante, the risk of loss through exchange rate
movements will be reflected in the price U.S. citizens will be willing to pay for stock.
72. There is no inherent reason why consumers should bear the cost of an overinvest-
ment in trademark capital. Of course, if there are economic reasons for inflexible margins,
then the parallel market owes its existence to free-riding, and therefore is not welfare
enhancing.
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tinct from the "market" value, of the trademark is unaffected.7
The effects of the parallel market were assumed to act only on
price premiums and therefore "market values" of past investments
and incentives for future investments in trademarks. 74 The effects
are of a temporary nature unless the dollar appreciation, and
therefore the parallel market, are permanent phenomena."' In con-
trast, this section focuses on the "reputational" value of the trade-
mark that can be "permanent" even if parallel competition is
eliminated.
Assume gray market importers sell lower quality products.
Gray market goods that are inferior to authorized goods will disap-
point consumer expectations and possibly increase the costs of
consumer information. 76 For example, a gray market good may be
last year's model or it may not have been properly stored or
shipped or may not be suitable for use in this country (e.g., differ-
ent electric currents). Specifically, Duracell (and perfume manu-
facturers) alleges that gray market imports of batteries (perfumes)
lose their freshness and therefore are not as durable as those in the
authorized chain. Camera dealers claim that gray market cameras
are damaged by improper shipment and storage and that compo-
nents such as a carrying bag and strap are not included.
Lower quality products diminish the reputational value of the
trademark. Consumers who receive lower quality products will per-
ceive them as being of deceptive quality. If authorized products
cannot be distinguished from gray market products, consumers will
either stop purchasing the trademark good regardless of its source
or will not pay a price premium for the trademark good as dis-
cussed in Section B. The net effect of deception is a decrease
(shift) in demand, and therefore lower prices and price premia for
trademark products. The market value of the trademark will fall
and the lower premiums will mean fewer quality assurance invest-
73. Consumer deception can have a legal meaning that is not necessarily implied in this
analysis. For the purpose of this discussion, consumer deception is an unanticipated lower
quality product or service from parallel importers where consumer anticipation is based on
either trademark claims or prior purchases and services received from authorized sellers.
74. That is, if price premiums should adjust in competitive equilibrium for the reasons
enumerated above, the firm's reputation or what is at stake should also adjust. On the other
hand, if price premiums are assumed not to adjust, then the reputational value will also be
affected in the long run.
75. See Ross, Dollar's Drop Drubs Gray Marketeers: Fewer Back-Door Imports Can Be
Sold at Bargain Prices as a Result, Wash. Post, May 4, 1986, at F3 ("[T]here is widespread
agreement that the [gray market] problem has receded.").
76. See LEXECON, supra note 18, at 43-50.
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ments in the future.
Gray market sellers may also fail to provide post-sale services,
such as warranties, that consumers expect because of the claims of
the trademark owner. If consumers are unable, or find it costly, to
distinguish authorized sales from gray market sales, then a con-
sumer who purchases a gray market good may take the good to
authorized sellers for post-sales services (e.g., warranty, refund, ad-
justment). That is, the consumer may find it more convenient to
have the product serviced at an authorized seller. If parallel sellers
or authorized sellers refuse to provide post-sale services, then con-
sumers may perceive the quality as being deceptive. Authorized
sellers may provide post-sale services for gray market goods to
avoid diminishing the reputational value of the trademark. Thus,
the gray market may also free-ride off authorized sellers if they
provide a lesser amount of post-sale services than authorized sell-
ers. The gray market seller is at a competitive advantage by having
lower costs, that in turn are reflected in lower prices compared to
higher cost-authorized sellers.
If vertical restraints are enforced world-wide, a retailer will
weigh the benefits (i.e., cost savings) of free-riding by providing
lower quality products or services against the cost of forfeiting the
$24 premium if terminated (e.g., Table 1). In addition, a similar
calculus will be performed if the retailer breaches its agreement by
selling in the parallel market. If vertical restraints are not enforce-
able, thereby permitting free-riding or sales in the parallel market,
then it can be assumed that expenditures subject to free-riding be-
havior will be taken at the manufacturing or distribution level and
incorporated in the retailer's price. Accordingly, there can be no
cost advantage by the parallel importer over authorized U.S. im-
porters. Parallel importers must have a cost advantage in order to
free-ride.
However, if the dollar appreciates, an incentive for foreign re-
tailers to sell in the U.S. parallel market may result. But, this in-
centive exists only if U.S. premiums do not fall when the dollar
rises. The premium for services, similar to the premium for quality
assurance, should fall to some extent with a fall in the manufactur-
ers' price. For example, the cost of capital tied up in refunds and
inventory will decrease with a decrease in the cost of goods.
On the other hand, U.S. expenditures for labor, equipment or
building costs that may be necessary to provide services in the
United States are not related to the exchange rate. Therefore, it
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would seem more likely that U.S. service costs, relative to quality
assurance, will not fall proportionately with the rise in the dollar,
permitting a price difference between the United States and for-
eign countries. This price difference, due to cost rigidity coupled
with consumer deception, can lead to a gray market, despite the
incorporation of a margin for foreign free-ridable expenditures in
the parallel importer's cost.
Consumer expectations need not be disappointed even with
the presence of lower quality goods or services. A lower price
(lower premium) in the gray market may signal lower quality, in-
cluding the loss of services. For example, some purchasers will
make a tradeoff between an authorized product with all the ser-
vices and a gray market product without services, such as the ab-
sence of a warranty for a lower price. In these cases, a low quality
product is simply "de-bundling" the good from the services with-
out deception or free-riding. For example, in the case of Bell &
Howell, the gray market importer offered to display and include in
its advertising that it was responsible for warranty work on cam-
eras it sold. However, this kind of product differentiation may in-
crease consumer information costs, a cost the manufacturer at-
tempts to minimize by having a trademark.
Several other facts dilute these consumer deception assump-
tions. First, some gray market sellers have their own refund or re-
turn policies and provide warranties independent of those offered
by the manufacturer."8 Consumer complaints about gray market
goods do not appear to be a significant problem." Finally, gray
market sellers such as Montgomery Ward and K-Mart have trade-
77. See Katten, Memorandum to Gray Market Task Force on Consumer Protection
Issues Related to Gray Markets, 1985 F.T.C. 7 (detailed discussion of differences in gray
market versus authorized goods as well as an analysis of labeling requirements, deception
and warranties). A survey conducted by Market Probe International, Inc. showed that 32%
of consumers surveyed stated that they would prefer to pay $100 for an item with a war-
ranty from the trademark holder rather than pay $75 for the same item and receive a war-
ranty from the domestic distributor or retailer. Id. at 25. In a different context, one study of
the purchasers of Rolex watch replicas found that no one buying the replica thought they
were buying genuine Rolexes. The same survey found that 13% would have purchased the
genuine Rolex if the price of the replica had risen sufficiently. Higgins & Rubin, Counterfeit
Goods 29 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1986).
78. A number of gray market retailers are providing warranties independent of the
manufacturer. See McCosh, GM Warranty on Gray Market Cars, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Apr.
15, 1985, at 3; Are Those Cheap Camera Prices for Real?, CONSUMER REPORTS, May, 1985, at
300; Gilman, No Guarantees for Guarantees in Gray Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 33
(K-Mart Sale of Seiko watches with independent guarantee).
79. See Katten, supra note 77.
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marks that are specialized to distribution services rather than the
manufacture of goods. These stores are unlikely to be deceptive in
selling inferior goods or services because their trademark also de-
pends on repeat sales. For example, Montgomery Ward switched to
the gray market for some items after ten years as an authorized
dealer because of better service and value from the parallel import-
ers. 0 Thus, quality assurance expenditures of some retailers may
be a substitute, in part, for quality assurance expenditures of the
trademark owner. Department stores such as Neiman-Marcus, for
example, have considerable specific investments in the form of lux-
urious furnishings, storefronts and rugs, that serve as quality as-
surance in providing distributional services. Neiman-Marcus cus-
tomers are likely to accept quality assurances from the fact that
Neiman-Marcus handles the product rather than because the good
is from a particular manufacturer."'
Thus, the extent of any damage to the trademark reputation
will be a function, in part, of the types of stores that sell gray mar-
ket goods. There is no hard evidence of the relative sales volume of
gray market sellers such as Montgomery Ward or K-Mart versus
sellers such as 47th Street Photo.2 If Montgomery Ward and K-
Mart are deceptive in selling inferior goods or fail to provide con-
sumers with anticipated post-sale services such as warranties, they
will lose repeat sales and incur a loss on their specific trademark
capital. On the other hand, a gray market seller with little or no
specific capital can make a return on being deceptive by getting in
and out of the market or by catering to a market that does not
depend on repeat sales. Consumer deception may permanently af-
fect the reputation of trademarks. Unlike the analysis in sections C
and D, parallel competition in this case can have a lasting effect,
even if the dollar depreciates or parallel importers are eliminated.
80. The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 89.
Such companies provide independent post-sale services such as refunds and replacements.
81. There is no evidence that Neiman-Marcus sells gray market goods. However, given
the amount it spends on quality assurance, it would seem to be in their interest to purchase
in the gray market, especially in light of Robinson-Patman constraints discussed in Part III.
82. One could hypothesize that gray market sellers are likely to be large volume pur-
chasers because the transactions costs of gray market importers in establishing their own
distributional network is likely to be very high. K-Mart launched an extensive consumer
write-in campaign as a lobbying measure to voice reaction to government proposals to ban
parallel distribution.
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F. Summary
Section B presented an overview of the quality assurance liter-
ature that was used as a framework to analyze the free-rider argu-
ment. Because trademarks are used as a means of assuring quality,
it is particularly necessary to understand: (1) why some goods have
trademarks, whereas others do not; (2) what types of investments
are made in the trademark; (3) how the market provides a return
to these investments; and (4) what institutional arrangements are
necessary to maintain the value of these investments. A compara-
tive static approach was used by comparing pre-dollar appreciation
conditions with post-dollar appreciation conditions because the
rapid dollar appreciation in the 1980s coincided with the emer-
gence of the gray market in the 1980s. Section C analyzed trade-
mark investments confined to the manufacturer or distributor
level. This section concludes that the parallel market can be ex-
plained either by manufacturer price discrimination or price
premia that do not adjust with a dollar appreciation. Price dis-
crimination will be analyzed in Part III. Under reasonable assump-
tions, it is argued that price premia should adjust to a dollar ap-
preciation in a competitive equilibrium.
Section D analyzed vertical restraints. The parallel market
may be a means by which manufacturers can indirectly adjust in-
dependent retail margins, thereby avoiding losses on their own
trademark capital. Sections C and D present arguments that the
parallel market may be an efficient market adjustment process that
benefits U.S. consumers. Section E examined parallel importers
who may sell inferior goods or provide inferior services to that of
authorized retailers. In each case, it can be expected that the dollar
value of U.S. trademarks will fall as a result of parallel imports.
The only unambiguous case of free-riding occurs when parallel im-
porters deceptively sell lower quality products or provide less ser-
vices than anticipated by consumers. There is some evidence that
consumer deception is not a widespread problem. Unfortunately,
there is insufficient data to be able to conclude or test which is the
more plausible explanation.
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENTS
Proponents of gray markets argue that manufacturers' prices
discriminate between countries, thereby creating arbitrage oppor-
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tunities8 5 Parallel imports have the result of lowering prices to
U.S. consumers. Section A will discuss price discrimination based
on different demand elasticities. Some parallel importers also ar-
gue they are more efficient in distribution than authorized high
margin sellers. Section B considers the constraints on price and
marketing under the Robinson-Patman Act and its implication on
the gray market. In summary, proponents argue that price discrim-
ination or distributional inefficiencies in authorized distribution ar-
tificially restrict intrabrand competition to the disadvantage of
U.S. consumers.
A. Price Discrimination and Demand Elasticities
There are three elements necessary for price discrimination.
First, demand elasticities must differ between markets.8 4 Second, a
firm must be able to prevent, or make costly, independent resales
of the product between markets. Third, a firm must possess mar-
ket power. Parallel markets are defined as the unauthorized resale
of products from one market (country) to another market (coun-
try). If parallel importers arbitrage price differences set by dis-
criminating monopolists, then why have these arbitrage opportuni-
ties suddenly appeared in the 1980s?
First, it is possible that price discrimination existed prior to
the 1980s. However, parallel imports will not exist in the United
States unless there is a source of supply abroad. The existence of a
gray market has recently been observed. As discussed in Part II,
enforceable vertical restraints coupled with the forfeiture of spe-
cific capital investments can deter or eliminate incentives of sellers
to deal in the gray market even though arbitrage opportunities
may exist. Hence, the gray market may be explained by develop-
ments in foreign law during the 1970s and 1980s that restricted the
ability of foreign manufacturers to impose sanctions on foreign re-
tailers who resold to parallel importers.
Second, as discussed in Part II, a rapid dollar appreciation oc-
83. Presumably this is what motivated William Niskanen, then a member of the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors, to state "I just don't understand why in the world the U.S. gov-
ernment should become an instrument for enforcing price discrimination between U.S. and
foreign markets." Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7,
1985, at 89.
84. See Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third Degree
Price Discrimination, 71 AM. EcON. REv. 242 (1981) (full analysis of the welfare conse-
quences of domestic price discrimination).
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curred in the 1980s. All other factors being equal, a dollar appreci-
ation can lead to even greater price differences if the United States
demand curve exhibits decreasing elasticity (in absolute value)
with a quantity increase. 5 Consider Table I in Part II. Prior to the
dollar appreciation, the assumption was that the manufacturer
charged one hundred twenty dollars to U.S. distributors and one
hundred twenty francs to French distributors. When the dollar ap-
preciated such that $1 =2F, the manufacturer received 240F ($120)
for units sold in the United States, and only 120F for units sold in
France. Accordingly, manufacturs would ship more units to the
United States to receive the higher marginal revenue (in francs or
yen). The U.S. price, hence, falls as more units are sold. The man-
ufacturer would continue to ship to the United States until the
marginal revenue in the United States (measured in yen) equals
marginal revenue in France (measured in yen).8 6 However, a dis-
criminating monopolist would not decrease the U.S. price (mea-
sured in dollars) to sixty dollars ($60) (120F), which is the compet-
itive price with constant costs. The U.S. price charged would be
higher than sixty dollars ($60) but less than one hundred twenty
dollars ($120).
As a general rule, the greater the dollar appreciation and the
less elastic U.S. demand becomes with an increase in quantity, the
greater the price differences between countries. On the other hand,
if the U.S. demand curve exhibits constant elasticity or increased
elasticity (in absolute value) with a quantity increase, then price
differences will get smaller or not increase at all. While a dollar
appreciation may lead to larger price differences, thereby enhanc-
ing arbitrage opportunities, it does not necessarily follow that it
must lead to greater price differences.87 Whether U.S. demand
85. This will be true for any product provided that its demand curve exhibits decreas-
ing elasticity (in absolute value) as the quantity increases. A linear demand curve is one
such curve. More generally, any convex or slightly concave demand curve will possess de-
creasing elasticity as the quantity increases. A demand curve will have to exhibit strong
concavity for the elasticity not to decline as the quantity increases. For a constant elasticity
demand curve, price discrimination is unaffected by the exchange rate.
86. If the manufacturer has constant costs, the price and quantity sold in France will be
unaffected by the dollar appreciation. This also assumes the dollar appreciated against the
manufacturer's currency (e.g., yen) in the same degree as against the franc.
87. While parallel imports are generally assumed not to be in the manufacturer's inter-
est because they arbitrage price differences, it is possible that manufacturers may sanction
and encourage parallel imports to eliminate price differences. For example, assume United
States demand elasticity increases or remains constant with a quality increase. As discussed
above, price differences will get smaller or not increase at all even though the firm has mar-
ket power. But consider the contractual price rigidity discussed in Part II D as a result of an
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elasticizes, becomes less elastic, more elastic, or remains constant
as quantity increases, is an empirical issue, not a theoretical issue.
Data is not available to estimate demand elasticities.
The principal difficulty with the price discrimination explana-
tion is that foreign manufacturers must have some degree of mar-
ket power. While it can be argued that vertical restraints can be
used to facilitate collusion and thereby price discrimination among
manufacturers or retailers, there is a general consensus among
economists that vertical restraints are likely to be pro-competitive
(i.e., prevent free-riding) in the absence of certain factors.8  The
transaction costs of obtaining a consensus for a collusive agreement
are high if there are a large number of participants. The industries
subject to the gray market do not appear to be concentrated at the
manufacturer level.
8 9
ex post over-investment in trademark capital by U.S. retailers. The effect of such rigidity
will be price differences that may not be in the manufacturer's interest. By lowering the
United States price through supplying the parallel market, the manufacturer's total reve-
nues may increase more than proportionately to total costs, thereby increasing profits. Thus,
parallel competition can have a desired effect to both consumers and manufacturers by
eliminating price differences.
88. See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [here-
inafter POSNER]; Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribu-
tion: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). Posner states:
An agreement to divide markets is a classic method of cartelization. Its advan-
tages compared to price fixing are that the parties do not have to negotiate a
common price and do not to worry about dissipating cartel profits in non-price
competition. If consumers are highly mobile, however, market division may not
be an effective method of cartelization; adherence to the agreement will be diffi-
cult to police, and supplementary price-fixing agreement may be necessary to
maintain an "equitable" division of the cartel's profits among its members. Price
fixing and market division are thus alternative methods for achieving the same
thing-monopoly pricing and profits-with the choice governed by the circum-
stances facing the cartel.
POSNER at 159.
89. It is, of course, possible although unlikely that U.S. authorized retailers can collude
to create market power. See Easterbrook, Restricted Dealing is a Way to Compete, REG.
Jan/Feb. 1984, at 23-27 (1984). Even if the transaction costs of an agreement are overcome,
there are incentives for any particular member to cheat on the cartel price(s) and thereby
erode the cartel price(s). Without the assistance of government enforcement, both monitor-
ing and enforcement of a cartel agreement are not likely to be effective. There does not
appear to be any government restrictions on entry in the industries subject to the gray
market that would foster market power. Thus interbrand competition would seem to pre-
clude the ability of foreign manufacturers to price discriminate among countries. But as
discussed in the following section, trade restrictions can create market power.
INTERNATIONAL GRAY MARKET
B. Trade Restrictions and International Price
Discrimination
In 1776, Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, presented
his arguments against restrictions on trade. His arguments were
premised on the principal of comparative advantage. In essence,
his argument was that there were mutual gains with international
trade, just as there are mutual gains from domestic trade. Free
trade results in each country specializing production in its areas of
comparative advantage and exchanging these goods in return for
goods for which it does not have a comparative advantage. Thus,
the wealth of nations rests with specialization and trade.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the current
debate over free trade versus fair trade. What is clear is the fact
that there are a number of agreements that restrict international
trade. Protectionist legislation or agreements exist in the United
States as well as other countries.9 0 For example, in April 1981, Ja-
pan agreed to a voluntary export restraint (VER) limiting Japa-
nese auto sales in the United States to 1.68 million annually.,1 The
effects of the VER have been to increase the U.S. price of Japanese
automobiles, increase the price of domestically-produced automo-
biles, and increase the quality of cars imported.2 Similarly, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) affects
thousands of goods imported to the United States. 8
90. See Milton Friedman, Outdoing Smoot-Hawley, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1987, at 22
("Malcolm Baldridge, . . .; William Brock ... ; and . .. Clayton Yeutter, the current trade
negotiators, have been making Smoot-Hawley look positively benign. Despite the harm it
did, Smoot-Hawley had at least one virtue-the tariffs it imposed did yield revenue to the
Treasury.").
91. See generally Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Ex-
ports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market
Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INT'L L. J. 99 (1986).
92. See Feenstra, Automobile Prices and Protection: The U.S.-Japan Trade Restraint,
in THE NEW PaOTECTIONIST THREAT TO WORLD WELFARE, (D. Salvatore ed. 1987).
93. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, SS U.N.T.S. 187, See also Blackhurst, Marian & Tumlir,
Trade Liberalization, Protectionism, and Interdependence, Studies in International Trade,
Geneva, November (1977). This study lists several of the goods subject to the gray market.
"New trade restrictions have been imposed in the last few years on many new products.
Most of them, however, are concentrated in a few manufactured product groups: textiles,
clothing and shoes; steel; transport equipment, mainly ships; and such diverse light engi-
neering products as TV apparatus, ball-bearings, thermionic valves, dry-cell batteries and so
forth." Id. at 44.
The report describes the difficulties in measuring the extent or degree of trade restric-
tions. Quantitative estimates of the magnitude of the trade flows under restraint are unsat-
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International price discrimination can exist because of trade
restrictions even though the firms or industries have no monopoly
or market power. The effect of a quota or VER is to restrict im-
ports, thereby permitting firms in the exporting countries to set
prices similarly if they were to organize into a cartel. The principal
difference with a quota or VER is that the cartel agreement is en-
forced by the United States, whereas a private cartel agreement is
subject to enforcement and free-rider problems. Thus, a lower
price can exist in the exporting country that has a comparative ad-
vantage compared to the importing country with a quota. Trade
restrictions can create market power and effectively separate mar-
kets to permit price discrimination.
Consider the case of tariffs in conjunction with changes in the
exchange rate. As discussed in Part III A above, it is necessary to
assume inelastic demand if changes in the exchange rate are to ex-
plain increased price differences and therefore increased arbitrage
(gray market) opportunities. Adjustments in quantity will result in
a unitary or elastic demand because of a change in the exchange
rate. Hence, a new equilibrium, where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost, thereby leading to smaller or no changes in the rela-
tive prices of a discriminating monopolist, will be achieved.
This analysis changes, however, if quantity adjustments are
constrained by a U.S. quota or VER. For example, initially assume
$1 = 1 yen and the price of imports was $1 at the quantity set by
the quota. Now assume that there is a change in the exchange rate
such that $1 = 2 yen. Without a change in the quota, the importer
will now receive 2 yen for his exports instead of $1. Regardless of
the elasticity of demand in the United States, the importer will
now receive twice the revenue. The price of $1 may not be the
profit-maximizing price and quantity, but the quantity (quota) is
determined in the United States and not in Japan. Thus, trade re-
strictions permit a more general case of increased price discrimina-
tion as a result of changes in the exchange rate because it is not
isfactory for at least three reasons, all of which impart a downward bias to the estimate.
First, the magnitude of the trade flow under restraint tells little about the degree of re-
straint; in the absence of protection, the flow would be larger, but it is impossible to say by
how much. Second, one cannot count as protection anti-dumping or countervailing measures
which are, in principal, legitimate actions to protect fair competition; yet it must be
surmised that in a period of generally rising protectionist pressure, anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing procedures may also be abused for protectionist purposes. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the uncertainty generated by restrictive measures actually taken, as well as by the
pressure for additional ones, is in itself a highly effective deterrent to trade. Id.
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necessary to assume market power or a particular elasticity. Arbi-
trage opportunities (gray market) will increase with a change in
the exchange rate.
The above analysis is premised on the exporting firms captur-
ing the rents or profits created by the quota. Of course, if the ex-
porting firms were in a competitive industry, they would eventu-
ally bid the export price down to where domestic prices equaled
export prices adjusted for differences in costs, such as transporta-
tion costs. At the other extreme, the government of the exporting
country could capture all the rents of a U.S. quota by requiring an
export license and charging fees. That is, a U.S. quota creates
rents, thereby generating a situation of excess demand of foreign
countries to export. The exporting government will then charge a
license fee equal to the rents created by the quota.
A change in the exchange rate would not explain an increase
in arbitrage opportunities (gray market) under either extreme. The
U.S. price would be bid down to adjust for a change in the ex-
change rate, with a competitive market in exports and no licenses.
With export licenses, arbitrage opportunities created by the price
differences between countries brought about by a change in the ex-
change rate are captured by the exporting government. Gray mar-
ket exporters would also have to bid for the licenses, thereby elimi-
nating price advantage. However, a number of scenarios between
these two extremes exist. Assume there are no export licenses and
that, prior to the change in exchange rates, the U.S. quota was a
non-binding constraint in that rents were not created. Foreign
manufacturers with U.S. trademark registrants and trademark cap-
ital would have an advantage over their competitors, who do not
have a U.S. presence or brand-name capital to take advantage of a
change in the exchange rate. The quota will become a binding con-
straint creating rents with the change in the exchange rate. With-
out export licenses, the gray market will replace authorized exports
by charging lower prices. In this case, the gray market is not neces-
sarily free riding off the trademark. Rather, it is simply taking ad-
vantage of arbitrage opportunities created by the U.S. quota or
VER.9
4
Foreign governments would not likely remain passive in re-
94. Foreign manufacturers may engage in rent-seeking by lobbying for export licenses
in their own country, even in the absence of quotas or tariffs in the United States. In this
case, a ban on gray markets in the United States supports the cartel agreement of the for-
eign country.
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sponse to a binding U.S. quota or VER. There are rents that can
be captured by either foreign firms or foreign governments, or
both, that are dissipated by competition from the gray market.
Rent seeking by these firms or governments should lead to export
licenses that would in turn eliminate the competitive gray market.
However, there are difficulties faced by firms with a multinational
market. Foreign countries or foreign manufacturers have no incen-
tive to restrict exports to countries where they do not have a com-
parative advantage. Exports to these countries will have to com-
pete with the importing country's firms.
In a multinational market, the price of imported goods will
vary across countries (i.e., international price discrimination) de-
pending on comparative advantage, exchange rates, and quota or
VER considerations. The United States could have a quota restric-
tion for certain imports from Japan, but these same Japanese
goods could be imported to France without quotas. If France has a
lower price for Japanese goods because they do not impose quotas
on Japanese imports, then gray market entrepreneurs can arbi-
trage the price differential between Japan and the United States
by trans-shipping through France. 5 An additional problem exists
for the foreign manufacturer with a multinational market. While a
Japanese manufacturer may engage in rent seeking with the Japa-
nese government for export licenses, for example, it may not be in
a position to do the same thing in France or other countries to
curtail the gray market. Many foreign countries are pre-Sylvania
in terms of vertical restraints.96
There are several facts about the gray market that support the
above argument. First, gray market goods are imported from nu-
merous countries other than the country of manufacturing origin.
Moreover, a quota that is effective will result in high quality im-
ports. 7 A quota represents a valuable property right to the export-
ing country. Suppose there are two imports - product A is high
quality and sells for $100 and product B is low quality and sells for
95. Alternatively, if the United States has a tariff on Japanese imports and no tariffs on
French imports, and there are no U.S. tariffs on imports from France, then an arbitrage
opportunity also exists by trans-shipping through France.
96. Continental T.V. Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). One interpretation
of the actions by foreign manufacturers and their United States trademark registrants in
lobbying the U.S. government fcr a ban on unauthorized imports is to protect the rents
created by U.S. quotas or VERs.
97. See supra note 14. It has been alleged that some gray markets represent the low
end of the quality spectrum which are not sold by authorized dealers in the United States.
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$50,and both products fall under the quota. Suppose the quota cre-
ates a rent on each product of twenty percent. The firm that pro-
duces A will be able to pay a license fee equal to $20 times the
quota, whereas the firm that produces B is only able to pay $10
times the quota. Firm A will outbid firm B."8 The same argument
would apply to a per-unit tariff imposed by the United States. For
example, suppose the tariff were $12 per unit. Firm A would still
be able to earn a rent ($20 - $12), whereas firm B would be priced
out of the market." If U.S. quotas or tariffs were not binding con-
straints, and thus did not create rents, it would be expected that
U.S. imports would represent a broad spectrum of quality. How-
ever, the gray market is clearly associated with high-quality goods.
There may be other reasons for this as discussed in Part II, but the
above factors are suggestive that trade restrictions may be the
cause of the gray market.
C. Cost Justified Price Differences
There are a number of circumstances in which price differ-
ences may not be the result of price discrimination or lead to
supra-competitive profits. For example, markets may be such that
quality assurance investments have differential effectiveness as dis-
cussed in Part II. Price differences may also be necessary to ac-
commodate short-run, unexpected market conditions in various re-
gions or countries. Without price differences, short-run market
fluctuations that vary by region would disrupt the dealer network
and individual marketing investments in such regions.100 If sup-
98. The same argument would apply if both products A and B were produced by the
same manufacturer.
99. A per-unit tariff, similar to per unit transportation costs, also changes relative
prices in the importing country that favors high quality (priced) goods over low quality
goods. The change in relative prices explains why a proportionately greater quantity of high
quality oranges and beef are shipped from California and Texas to New York and a propor-
tionately greater quantity of low quality oranges and beef are sold in California and Texas.
100. Two camera companies reported to Customs that they must set prices for a rea-
sonable period of time to avoid "yo-yoing" their distribution network. See D.O.C. supra
note 14, at 12. A spokesman for Mercedes-Benz stated that they prefer to maintain stable
prices and that Mercedes "did increase its prices in the mid-1970's when the dollar weak-
ened against the West German mark . . . but has since stuck to a policy of holding prices
firm regardless of currency fluctuations." See Holusha, Unauthorized Sales Up for Cars
From Europe, N. Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at D1.
Costs are also involved when a manufacturer changes its wholesale price. Retailers may
have catalogues printed on an annual basis and may be obligated to honor the catalogue
price if the product is offered. Contracts may have been made which cause losses to whole-
salers if they have to absorb a price increase. For such reasons as these, manufacturers will
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plies are fixed in the short run and an oxygenous change (e.g., dol-
lar appreciates) occurs, such that market A has a higher demand
than B, then shipments exclusively to market A will disrupt and
lower the prior trademark investment in market B (i.e., exclusive
dealers in B can no longer supply the product). '" Price differences
of the fixed supplies perform an allocative function without de-
stroying or diminishing the goodwill associated with a distribution
network.
Up to this point it has been assumed that authorized sellers
are as efficient in the functions they perform as gray market sell-
ers. A distribution network can be complex with a variety of func-
tions at various levels in the distribution chain. The functions, as
discussed in Part II, range from the quality assurance of inventory
to the provision of services. In order to achieve a broad market
penetration, a national distributor may deal with diverse firms that
have comparative advantages in performing various functions. For
example, small retailers may not have the facilities to handle a
large inventory to meet fluctuating demand. In such a case, the
distributor will provide inventory services or utilize jobbers. On the
other hand, large chain stores may be more efficient in maintaining
inventories than distributors or jobbers. In a competitive market,
the distributor's price to the chain store would be lower than that
charged to the small retailer because of the cost savings.
The Robinson-Patman Act, however, prohibits price differ-
ences in Section 2(a). ' °0 There is a cost justified defense to price
try to avoid frequent changes in their wholesale prices. During a period of dollar apprecia-
tion, lags in adjusting wholesale prices will normally open up arbitrage possibilities and in-
crease gray market imports until the wholesale prices are adjusted. Gray market importers,
due only to lags and not to monopoly power, will eventually be eliminated as wholesale
prices adjust. If the dollar continues to strengthen over a sustained period of time, as in the
1980 -late 1984 period, then lags could explain price discrimination and gray market im-
ports over a longer period. Vertical restraints are also likely to lead to "sticky" prices as
discussed supra in part IID.
101. See Anderson, Comments on Gray Market, FTC (1985)(mimeo).
102. Throughout this section, references to Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act
should technically be references to Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by provisions
contained in the first section of the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. §13 (1982). The rele-
vant portion of Section 2(a) that pertains to the defense is: ". . . That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost
of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix
and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular
commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater
quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or
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differences, but it entails evidentiary problems that make it ex-
tremely difficult or impossible to prove.' 3 The Robinson-Patman
Act has been strongly criticized by a number of commentators,
such as Posner and the Department of Justice.10' In general, it is
argued that the Act restricts pro-competitive price and marketing
flexibility. In addition to the difficulties associated with the cost
justification defense under Section 2(a), certain practices are per se
illegal without a showing of competitive harm;'05 buyers are ex-
posed to liability for bargaining over price; competition is re-
stricted for new markets and consumers; private brands and prod-
uct differentiation is encouraged; ' °0  inefficiencies in the
promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be con-
strued to permit differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixed
and established," Section 2(b) provides that the burden of proof is on the person so changed
to affirmatively show justification. 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (1982). Section 2(b) also provides for a
good faith "meeting of the competition" defense. 15 U.S.C. §13(b) (1982).
103. R. POSNER, THE ROINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFER-
ENCEs, 40-41 (1976) [hereinafter POSNER II] has argued that:
.. .The statutory structure is objectionable: cost justification would be an ap-
propriate matter of defense were there some basis for thinking that most price
differences were discriminatory - that is, not cost-justified - but in fact discrimi-
natory prices in the economic sense are surely the exception rather than the rule.
A better presumption would be that a price difference was cost-justified than
that it was not . . . .The main objection to the cost-justification provision in
Section 2(a) is not that the burden of proof is on the defendant but that the
commision has been so niggardly in the scope it has allowed to the cost-justifica-
tion defense . . . . Thus, the act has in practice undoubtedly operated to sup-
press price differences that were justified by differences in cost . . . . It is
enough to note that the defense has been so interpreted are applied to make it
virtually impossible for firms to justify price on the basis of cost differences.
Items of genuine economic cost are excluded under arcane and unrealistic cost-
accounting principles. Id. at 40-41.
See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act, Ch. IIA(2) (1977)
(hereinafter Justice) (critical analysis of the cases brought by the FTC relating to defenses).
The difficulties lie in the fact that price differences have to be justified in terms of full costs.
Thus there are difficulties associated with allocating fixed and joint costs. Moreover, the
difference must he fully justified (100%) and not just substantially justified. Only 11 at-
tempts were made to use the defense in contested FTC cases during the period 1936-1954.
Of these, only 2 were fully successful. 2 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980), at 578.
104. POSNER II, supra note 103; Justice, supra note 103. But see Brooks, Report of
Pilot Field Survey of Market Effects of Robinson-Patman Orders (commissioned by the
FTC). The report is based on survey data of seven cases. The report has been criticized as
being superficial and poorly controlled.
105. The defense is not available for alleged violations of Section 2(c) (brokerage pay-
ments). 15 U.S.C. §13(c) (1982). Disproportionate promotional allowances, Sections 2(d) and
2(e), are per se violations without a cost justified defense. 15 U.S.C. §13(d),(e) (1982).
106. One way to possibly avoid the Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions on price uni-
formity is to use private labels and/or unique product specifications. This type of circum-
vention not only increases direct costs (such as production and inventory costs), it increases
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distribution network are preserved; more efficient forms of distri-
bution are inhibited; and brokers are unduly protected and the
proportionality test for marketing allowances leads to wasteful ex-
penditures and inefficiencies.107 If distributors charge equal prices
to sellers when there are differences in cost, then equal prices en-
courage distributional inefficiencies. 0 8 A parallel market sanc-
tioned by the manufacturer may thus achieve distributional effi-
ciencies that its U.S. trademark registrant may find costly because
of the Robinson-Patman Act.'0 9
the cost of marketing and information costs to consumers as well. If a Kenmore washing
machine marketed by Sears is really of "like grade and quality" to that marketed under the
"Whirlpool" name, then there is an atrophy of information to the consumer. Private labels
may achieve other marketing objectives, but their use is likely to have been extended under
the Act. Parallel distribution of goods that are not authorized are similar to private labels if
the two distribution channels are distinguished in some manner.
107. See Justice, supra note 103 (case analyses of these points).
108. The analysis above focuses on a single commodity with different prices. However,
the Robinson-Patman Act often fails to consider that there may be varieties of a commod-
ity. For example, differences in space, time, quality and uncertainty of a so called commod-
ity may in reality be several commodities. Thus, charging the same price for an orange in
Florida and Alaska is discriminatory in an economic sense. In addition, these commodities
may result from a "joint production process" such that it may be meaningless to ask
whether prices are discriminatory just as it is meaningless to ask what should be the "appro-
priate prices" of wool and mutton when the sum of the prices equals the marginal cost of
raising and slaughtering a lamb. The distinction is illustrated by the Taussig-Pigou contro-
versy over whether multiple railroad rates could be explained by Marshallian joint supply
(Taussig's position) or common costs and ability to discriminate between buyers (Pigou's
position). Ekelund & Hulett, Joint Supply, The Taussig-Pigou Controversy, and the Com-
petitive Provision of Public Goods, 16 J. L. & ECON. 369 (1973). The controversy is similar to
the distinction here in that the above can be classified as the Pigou position and what fol-
lows as the Taussig position in explaining price differences The principal criticism directed
against Robinson-Patman is that it fails to distinguish different varieties of commodities
(e.g., in a spatial, time, uncertainty and quality dimensions) such as to make equal prices
discriminatory or it fails to adequately consider jointness in supply. See L. PILIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983) (an excellent survey of pricing with respect to
space, time, income differences, and quality differences). See also M. GREENHUrr & H. OHTA,
THEORY OF SPATIAL PRICING AND MARKET AREAS (1975).
109. Automobile parts are among the goods imported through the gray market. There
have been a series of automotive parts cases brought under the Act. See, e.g., Alhambra
Motor Parts, Inc., 68 F.T.C. 1039 (1965). In this case a co-operative in its warehouse capac-
ity bought large parts inventories on its own account, stored them at its own risk, and filled
members' orders out of the co-operative's inventory. The FTC ruled that since the co-opera-
tive was owned by retailer members, discounts would be considered discount payments to
the retailer members and because members were in competition with non-members, the dis-
counts would have to be cost justified. The FTC, after analysis, rejected the justification
offered and struck down the discounts.
The motor parts cases illustrrte the difficulties associated with combining distributional
functions within a parallel or multiple distribution system such as a combination of retail-
ers, direct-ship retailers, distributors, wholesalers, and integrated wholesalers-retailers. The
difficulties associated with justifying functional discounts to parallel distribution systems
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A foreign manufacturer is subject to the Robinson-Patman
Act, but there are problems of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
firm other than through a U.S. subsidiary. Exports by U.S. manu-
facturers are not covered by the Act. 110 Foreign countries that
have statutes similar to Robinson-Patman are also likely to exempt
exports."' Thus, a foreign manufacturer is not likely to be limited
by its own laws in sanctioning parallel distribution to the United
States and to the extent that parallel distribution is not "author-
ized" it may not be subject to Robinson-Patman. Even if data were
available, it would be difficult to test whether parallel importers
are more efficient in distribution than authorized sellers." 2
Despite the limitations of data, there are several factors that
support an inference that the gray market may be used to circum-
vent the Robinson-Patman Act. First, the Robinson-Patman Act
has been interpreted as providing relief for small businesses and
discriminating against large discount chain stores and mail order
houses.' If the specialization of certain functions is difficult to
are likely to lead to inefficiencies and higher retail prices. Functional discounts not only
expose the seller to liability under Section 2(a), but may also expose the buyer to liability
under Section 2(c) or 2(f). 15 U.S.C. §13(c),(f) (1982). However, out of the more than one
thousand-one hundred (1,100) Robinson-Patman cease-and-desist orders issued by the FTC,
only thirty (30) were brought under Section 2(f). F.M. SCHERER, supra note 103, at 574.
110. Under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, the Secretary of Commerce may
issue export trade certificates of review granting protection to the holder and its members
from treble damage suits and criminal and injunctive suits under federal and state antitrust
laws for export conduct specified in the certificate and carried out during its effective period
in compliance with its terms and conditions. To receive a certificate of review an applicant
must establish, inter alia, that the proposed conduct will not include any act that may
reasonably be expected to result in the sale for consumption of a gray market or parallel
distribution. Moreover, the clause seems to be directed at Robinson-Patman price differ-
ences where the export price is likely to be lower than the domestic price.
111. See Grant, Recent Developments in the Control of Price Discrimination in Coun-
tries Outside North America, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 593 (1981). See also, Baumol & Ordover,
Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 247 (1985); Gerber, The Gelman
Approach to Price Discrimination and Other Forms of Business Discrimination, 27 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 241 (1982).
112. Different allowances for quality assurance expenditures at various levels in the dis-
tribution chain, as discussed in Part II, are likely to be extremely difficult to cost justify and
may also be considered disproportionate promotion allowances. That is, there are likely to
be disputes over accounting for these types of expenditures. Such expenditures are much
more complicated in an accounting sense relative to more simplified cases such as savings in
inventory costs that have been disputed. Moreover, the best defense for these cases is to do
a preliminary cost study prior to implementing the practice.
113. See R. POSNER, ANTrrausT LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, Part 11 (1976) [herein-
after POSNER III]; Ross, Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 27 J. L. &
EcoN. 243 (1984) (Part IV); Justice, supra note 103, at Ch. III (discussion of the historical
background leading up to the passage of the Act). Note that enforcement of the Act also has
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justify in terms of cost, then certain otherwise efficient outlets will
be precluded as authorized dealers."' In part, purchasers of gray
market imports are large direct purchaser chains such as Mont-
gomery Ward and K-Mart." 5 As discussed in Part II, gray market
sellers such as Montgomery Wards and K-Mart that have a repu-
tation at stake are not likely to free-ride.
Second, while firms subject to parallel import competition ar-
gue that the source of gray market goods is from independent third
parties:
... Some parallel importer respondents don't agree, asserting
that foreign manufacturers and authorized distributors are
sources of parallel imports."'... Parallel importers ...
[stated] . . . the foreign parent or subsidiary at least tolerates
and sometimes encourages parallel imports. 1' 7
Thus, if the gray market is sanctioned by the manufacturer, the
alternative explanations of price discrimination and free-riding can
be ruled out because a gray market would not be in the manufac-
turer's interests.
Third, several cases exist in the domestic gray market where
the source of gray markets are non-profit institutions. Non-profit
institutions such as hospitals and universities are exempt under
the Robinson-Patman Act, provided the purchases are for their
own use."" Non-profit groups such as hospitals, medical clinics and
international-relief groups are among the sources of gray market
been against buyer co-operatives which perform certain functions that the manufacturer or
distributor would otherwise have to perform.
114. See POSNER III, supra note 113, at 42; Justice, supra note 103, at Ch. IIB.
115. The National Association of Catalog Showroom Merchandisers, Inc. and 47th
Street Photo are also listed as selling parallel imports in the Department of Commerce
Study. Seven trade associations that might be interpreted as buyer cooperatives were listed
as favoring parallel imports while only four trade associations opposed parallel imports.
Twelve wholesalers / distributors / importers favor parallel imports and only two are in
opposition. Opponents of the gray market appear to be small firms for which the Robinson-
Patman Act was designed to protect. Forty-one retailers, presumably authorized dealers,
oppose parallel imports while only eight favor them. D.O.C. supra note 14, at 2.
While the Act was passed to help small businesses, only 36, or 6.4% of the 564 compa-
nies named in FTC Robinson-Patman Act complaints between 1961 and 1974 had annual
sales of $100 million or more, more than 60% had sales below $5 million. Moreover, between
84% and 85% of the respondents with sales of less than $10 million, but only 37% of the
$100 million companies. F.M. Scherer, supra note 103, at 581.
116. D.O.C., supra note 14, at 6.
117. Id., at 8.
118. Section 4 of the Act as amended, 15 U.S.C. 13(c), 52 Stat. 446 (1938).
[Vol. 19:1
INTERNATIONAL GRAY MARKET
pharmaceutical products." ' The source of gray market personal
computers may come from, in part, non-profit institutions such as
colleges and universities. These examples illustrate how the Robin-
son-Patman Act may be a binding constraint in the United States.
Lower prices may also be given to volume purchasers (e.g., chains)
similar to exempt institutions in the absence of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act or if a cost-justified defense were easier to prove.
Fourth, as discussed in Part II, a ban would be the most effec-
tive public policy in preventing parallel importers from selling
lower quality goods, offering lower quality services, or free-riding
off quality assurance investments. However, COPIAT, an interest
group comprised of foreign and U.S. manufacturers, distributors
and retailers, have proposed a mixture of labeling and reasonable
demarking of gray market imports. Thus, the COPIAT proposal on
its face would seem to tolerate a gray market that distanced itself
from the authorized channel by labeling and demarking.': ° A label-
ing and demarking proposal, instead of a ban, is consistent with
avoidance of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 and the gray
market should have appeared prior to the 1980's as a means to
circumvent the Act.' As discussed in Part II, a change in foreign
law will lead to a shift of quality assurance investments and service
costs from the retail level to the distributor level. A shift in invest-
ment and service costs to the distributor level will mean that for-
eign retailers, all other circumstances being equal, will pay a higher
manufacturer or distributor's price than the price charged to U.S.
retailers who make quality assurance investments and incur service
costs because vertical restraints are enforceable. Higher foreign re-
tailer prices mean higher prices to parallel importers. The evidence
available, however, suggests parallel importers pay a lower price
119. Gray Market: Sale of Drugs Bought from Hospitals Raises Worries About Safety,
Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1985, at 1.
120. LEXECON, supra note 18. There are other explanations for COPIAT proposing de-
marking rather than a ban. But reasonable demarking or labeling is a means for authorized
sellers to be distinguished from parallel importers in order to provide some limited protec-
tion for authorized margins without totally eliminating parallel imports.
121. Foreign imports have increased as a percentage of U.S. Gross National Product
since 1936. Moreover, the dollar appreciation of the 1980's increased imports dramatically as
evidenced by the increased balance of trade deficit. There may be scale economies in estab-
lishing parallel markets whereby the import market may not have been of sufficient volume
prior to 1980. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine international trade
trends.
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than U.S. retailers. 2 2 In order to understand how it may be possi-
ble that parallel importers pay a lower price than their authorized
competitors, it is necessary to further examine the interrelation-
ship between vertical restraints and Robinson-Patman.
D. Vertical Restraints and Robinson-Patman
In Sylvania, 23 the court held that territorial restrictions are to
be considered under an antitrust rule of reason. Courts are re-
quired to balance the increase in interbrand competition against
the decrease in intrabrand competition. The interbrand versus in-
trabrand competition argument may be summarized in the follow-
ing terms. It is in the manufacturers' interest to minimize their
costs of distribution, as their costs are minimized by having com-
petition in the distribution process (i.e., intrabrand competition).
Thus, in the absence of marketing considerations, restrictive distri-
bution comes at a cost. But, competing distributors or retailers of
the same brand will have little incentive to invest in marketing the
brand in order to compete with other brands (i.e., interbrand com-
petition). Assuming marketing is more effective at the local level,
then interbrand competition is purchased at the cost of foregoing
intrabrand competition.
While, conceptually, intrabrand versus interbrand competition
may be defined as a movement along the demand curve versus a
shift in the demand curve, as a practical matter it is difficult to
distinguish between the two.12 The emphasis of this article has
been on quality assurance that can be considered as a proxy for
interbrand competition. A manufacturer's claims that attempt to
distinguish one product from another must be assured unless it is
assumed consumers have information prior to purchase to make
quality distinctions and quality claims are relatively inexpensive to
enforce. 2 5 Interbrand competition may include factors beyond
122. See D.O.C., supra note 14, at A51.
123. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
124. Marketing, like other social sciences, is not an exact science.
125. Quality assurance is not necessarily confined to observable "objective" data but
may include an assurance of "subjective" characteristics. For example, what is the quality
assurance in the case of perfumes that do not carry warranties? It may simply be an assur-
ance of its pre-marketing tests that indicates the sample group prefers the aroma of this
product over other products. It should also be noted that the quality assurance literature is
consistent with the economics of information literature such as "search", "experience" and
"credence" goods. Quality assurance includes both experience and credence type goods. The
advantage of the quality assurance framework is the insight it provides into the nature of
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quality assurance. Given the current state of the marketing litera-
ture, however, the quality assurance hypothesis is amenable to em-
pirical testing, whereas the term interbrand competition is
subjective.
Intrabrand competition, on the other hand, is best described
by activities of competing firms that have no brand or trademark.
For example, firms that sell "generic" products such as fresh fruits
or vegetables still perform a number of functions including adver-
tising. The advertising is in the form of "price" advertisements.
Price advertising is undertaken for the purpose of taking sales
away from other firms and is not free-ridable. 28 Moreover, only
the most efficient firms (with the lowest prices) will survive. Price
advertising provides information to consumers other than price,
such as the existence of the good and its availability at a specific
location, even though there may be no claims of quality. Thus a
manufacturer's decision calculus of whether to have vertical re-
straints or not is not a choice of advertising or not advertising, but
only the form of advertising. Moreover, as discussed in Part II, in-
terbrand competition may be carried out at the distributor level
trademark investments.
As a number of empirical studies have demonstrated, vertical restraints or high market-
ing costs will not necessarily lead to higher prices. Economies of scale and specialization
may not be realized unless there is a sufficient market. Advertising to the extent that it
increases demand may in fact lead to lower prices because of achieving economies of scale or
specialization in manufacturing or distribution. See Benham, The Effect of Advertising on
the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J L. & ECON. 337 (1972); Bond, et. al., Effects of Restrictions on
Advertising and Commercial Practices in the Professions: The Case of Optometry, (FTC,
1980); Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effect of Restrictions on Drug Price Advertising, 14
EcoN. INQUIRY 493 (1976); McChesney & Muris, The Effects of Advertising on the Quality
of Legal Services, 65 AMER. B. A. J 1503 (1979); Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the
Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
179; Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964). All of these studies
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that advertising lowers prices. Indeed the ef-
fect on consumer prices in the future is the cost that is expected to follow from reduced
marketing expenditures as a result of free-riding. However, there are a number of distinc-
tions between gray markets and these empirical studies. The studies were based on legal
restrictions prohibiting advertising. The studies generally do not distinguish between
brandname advertising and price advertising. That is, parallel distributors are likely to ad-
vertise but it will take the form of price advertising rather than brand advertising.
On the other hand, even if there were no advantages attributable to economies of scale
or specialization such that prices remain constant or increase, advertising is still beneficial
in the sense of a lower cost of information to consumers relative to consumer search cost in
the absence of advertising. The existence of price differences in the gray market, absent
price discrimination, suggests that marketing costs in the United States have not led to
lower prices in comparison to foreign countries.
126. Price advertising can be interpreted as creating "pecuniary" externalities on other
firms that are normally perceived as "competition" or welfare enhancing.
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and intrabrand competition at the retail level.
What is meant by "intrabrand competition" in light of the en-
forcement of the Robinson-Patman Act? Retailers that have com-
parative advantages in performing certain functions, such as main-
taining inventories, or have economies of scale in advertising or
service, may not receive a compensating price adjustment because
of the difficulties in proving a cost justified defense. The Robinson-
Patman Act, as enforced, changes the trade-off between interbrand
competition and intrabrand competition through restricting in-
trabrand competition and, thus, encouraging, at the margin, inter-
brand competition. In the absence of the Robinson-Patman Act,
intrabrand competition, in the form of parallel distribution, would
be more likely, distribution costs lower, retail prices lower and
quantity sold higher for any given manufacturer's price.'27
The effect of the evolution of foreign law on distribution costs
is likely to be more complicated than that discussed in Part II D.
It was argued that because export restrictions in foreign countries
are unenforceable, any quality assurance and free-ridable service
expenditures at the retail level would be shifted to the distributor
level, thereby increasing the price to foreign retailers. But an off-
setting effect is also likely to occur. In the absence of vertical re-
straints, distribution at the retail level will be competitive. In-
trabrand competition at the retail level is likely to create
distributional efficiencies. The focus of the analysis in Part II was
on quality assurance and free-ridable services. There are, however,
other distribution costs, such as maintaining inventories, refund
policies and other transaction costs, that may not be free-ridable.
The required margins for the cost of these functions will decrease
as intrabrand competition increases. The increased inefficiency in
performing these other functions is likely to result in a shift of
these functions from the distributor level to the retail level. Thus,
the increased margin required at the distributor level for inter-
brand competition may be partially offset by a decrease in the dis-
tributor's margin for other functions now performed more effi-
127. Note that it is price differences that can be challenged. A uniform price even
though it is discriminatory in an economic sense is not a violation of the Act. Thus, avoid-
ance of Robinson-Patman Act can be accomplished by a single distribution chain or charg-
ing the same price. Thus, it can be argued that the Robinson-Patman Act encourages RPM
agreements, thereby putting it at cross purposes with other antitrust law. In the absence of
the Act, it is likely there would be fewer vertical restraint cases brought. The importance of
this interrelationship is evidenced by the fact that of all private antitrust actions, approxi-
mately 30% are Robinson-Patman and 40% are. vertical restraint cases.
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ciently at the retail level."2 8
It can be argued that if efficiency gains of sufficient magnitude
can be realized, then the United States trademark registrant would
emulate foreign distribution. But this assumes the Robinson-Pat-
man Act is not a binding constraint on intrabrand competition in
the United States. Both systems may be inefficient. Too much (lit-
tle) intrabrand (interbrand) competition may exist in foreign coun-
tries because of restrictions on vertical restraints.12 Too much (lit-
tle) interbrand (intrabrand) competition may exist in the United
States because of Robinson-Patman. Dollar appreciation will in-
crease these differences unless margins adjust with the exchange
rate. But, for reasons discussed in Part II, pricing in the United
States is likely to be less flexible due to vertical restraints. The net
effect of parallel imports can be the enhancement of efficiency by
achieving lower distribution costs through intrabrand competition
than through authorized distribution. Moreover, the price that
parallel importers pay foreign retailers may include a quality as-
surance premium at least as great as the combined U.S. quality
assurance premium. From the manufacturer's standpoint, parallel
imports may not represent free-riding off U.S. quality assurance
investments if adjustments are made that credit premiums on par-
allel sales to the U.S. distributor.
E. Conclusion
Price differences between countries may increase with a dollar
appreciation provided that the required elasticity and market
power conditions are satisfied. The greater the price difference, the
greater the opportunity for arbitrage by parallel importers. Arbi-
trage, under these conditions, is welfare-enhancing to U.S. consum-
ers. However, there is no data to support the required elasticity or
market power conditions. United States demand elasticity could be
128. For example, consider the $48 distributor premium and $24 retailer premium in
Table 1. Now assume one-half of the respective premiums is for quality assurance and the
other one-half is for other functions (e.g., inventories). Assume that the $12 premium for
quality assurance at the retail level is absorbed by the distributor in foreign countries be-
cause of export restrictions. Further assume a forty percent efficiency gain in distribution
because of intrabrand competition at the retail level. The $12 added distributor premium
could be more than offset by the lower distributor premium for other costs. That is, a forty
percent efficiency gain in the combined costs for other functions would result in a $14.40
(40% x ($24 + $12)) savings.
129. This assumes that quality assurance investments that are shifted to the distributor
level are not as effective compared to investments at the retail level.
19871
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1
constant or become more elastic with a dollar appreciation.
Section B examined protectionist measures such as U.S. quo-
tas, tariffs, and voluntary export restraints (VER) that create in-
ternational price discrimination and therefore arbitrage opportuni-
ties for a gray market. Foreign manufacturers that have a multi-
national market would have difficulties in monitoring the arbitrage
opportunities created by various multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements. Trans-shipment of goods through different favored
nations that are not subject to U.S. trade restrictions can create
the lower prices that gray market suppliers receive.
Sections C and D examined the Robinson-Patman Act and its
effect on authorized distributional arrangements. If cost-justified
differences in price are difficult to prove under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, then intrabrand competition will be sacrificed, at the
margin, for interbrand competition, thereby creating distributional
inefficiencies. A controlled experiment to estimate the social cost of
the Robinson-Patman Act similar to the studies conducted to ex-
amine the social costs of RPM legislation is not possible. 30 A re-
cent study shows that firms subject to FTC complaints have in-
curred significant stock market losses.131  While FTC price
130. As one economist has stated: "The problem with the Robinson-Patman Act is that
it applies all across the country. We simply don't have a country like the United States in
every respect except that it does not have the Robinson-Patman Act. What we are left with,
since we do not have the laboratory experiment that we had with Fair Trade, is a much
more tentative basis of judgment and logic and inference." Hearings on the Robinson-Pat-
man Act before the Domestic Council Review Group on Regulating Reform, Tr. 261-61
(1975) (testimony of Kenneth G. Elzinga).
131. Ross examined the stock prices of a portfolio of grocery chain stores. His results
reveal that the chain portfolio began a series of negative abnormal returns from about June,
1935 (Robinson-Patman introduced in both houses at this time) and continued with a brief
pause in late 1936, for about two and one-half years. The cumulative loss in the portfolio
value over the period represents as much as 80 percent of its original value. Ross, supra note
113, at 250-60.
Ross also examined FTC consent orders under Robinson-Patman for the period August,
1962 through April, 1981. The results indicate a decline in the value of the stock portfolio of
10 percent within a period of 50 days before and 60 days after a consent order was entered.
Ross also examined cases with cease and desist orders and cases that were dismissed. The
decline in stock value is smaller in these cases relative to cases involving consent orders. The
surprising result, however, is that firms also lose value even when cases are dismissed and
the loss is about the same for firms which were ordered to cease and desist from the prohibi-
tive actions. What is surprising about the percentage decline is that the alleged violation
usually only consists of sales that represent only a small share of total sales by the corpora-
tion. Id. at 260-70. The results indicate that the market (as embodied in stock prices) re-
sponds in a dramatic way to FTC Robinson-Patman actions. The results of the Ross study
do not permit a conclusion of whether the decline in stock values are attributable to not
being able to price discriminate based on market power or a loss in price and marketing
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discrimination actions have declined over the years, private actions
remain at a high level with only a slight decline in recent years.
According to a recent study, private price discrimination actions
may represent as much as 17 percent of all private antitrust ac-
tions during the period 1973-1983.32 Thus, Robinson-Patman
would appear to be a binding constraint on a firm's pricing and
promotional background.
Foreign manufacturers, unlike their U.S. trademark regis-
trants, are able to circumvent Robinson-Patman through sanction-
ing the parallel market. For reasons discussed in Part II, vertical
restraint agreements may be too rigid if changes in the exchange
rate and foreign law were not anticipated. The parallel market cre-
ates intrabrand competition at the expense of interbrand competi-
tion that may be desirable, ex post, for foreign manufacturers.
Finally, the lessons learned from the enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act within the United States should create
reservations about applying the Robinson-Patman Act internation-
ally. Price differences between countries should not be presumed
to be the result of price discrimination absent a showing of some
indicia of market power or trade restrictions that create market
power. There are other reasons for price differences not related to
market power. Tables 1 and 2 in Part II used equal prices and
margins for expository reasons. The analysis of the effect of the
dollar appreciation does not change if differential prices and mar-
gins are assumed, provided that whatever separates the market is
not effected by the exchange rate. That is, if U.S. margins should
adjust in a competitive equilibrium, then price differentials be-
tween countries will be the same both before and after dollar ap-
preciation. The dollar appreciation is therefore not an explanatory
factor for the emergence of a gray market, even assuming differen-
tial margins.
A tremendous amount of data, including prices, costs, market-
ing expenditures, quantities, international trade agreements, and
the degree of trans-shipping, would be required to explain why
price differences exist. There are some inferences that can be
drawn to suggest that foreign manufacturers may explicitly or im-
plicitly sanction the parallel market. On the other hand, if the gray
flexibility that is cost justified.
132. Robinson-Patman Act FTC complaints averaged 74 cases per year during 1960-65
and declined to 5.6 per year during 1966-70. F.M. SCHERER, supra note 103, at 581. There
are even fewer cases in the 1980s.
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market is the result of trade restrictions, then foreign manufactur-
ers would want these trade restrictions enforced to capture the
rents. The most efficient way to enforce the trade restrictions, if
they are circumvented by trans-shipping, is to have a ban or other
restrictions on gray markets.
IV. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Despite the fact that luxury automobiles have received the
most publicity as an example of the gray market, they are not rep-
resentative of the gray market in general because of extensive reg-
ulations. Factors other than free-riding or price discrimination can
explain, in part, the price differences between the authorized and
gray market sale of luxury automobiles. The gas guzzler tax and
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) tax may account for be-
tween $2,800 to $3,800 of the price difference between the gray
market and authorized sales of automobiles. Costs of different
product liability and product recall standards, as between the
United States and foreign countries, may explain an additional
margin. Differences in equipment and differences in compliance
with emission and safety regulations also make comparisons diffi-
cult. The elimination of these factors may reduce the price differ-
ences sufficiently so that consumers would be unwilling to take the
risk of purchasing a gray market automobile. Thus, a general pol-
icy directed at gray markets should exclude the consideration of
luxury automobiles until such time that price differences can be
attributable to factors other than automobile regulation.
Many of the products subject to the gray market incur service
costs in the United States of only 20% of the sales price, yet price
differentials between authorized and parallel distribution appear to
be greater than twenty percent. This data, however, is not substan-
tiated or presented in detail, and it is not clear how certain ex-
penditures are defined, such as advertising or services, or whether
prices are suggested prices or transaction prices. The only conclu-
sion to be drawn is that the costs of obtaining data on worldwide
transactions is not likely to permit one to accept or reject the argu-
ments presented in Part II and III.
Until recently, trademark owners have been unsuccessful in
restricting parallel imports either by legislation or in the courts. 13
133. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
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There have been a number of legislative proposals to restrict or
ban parallel imports. '34 The price discrimination arguments state
that parallel competition decreases U.S. prices, and any restriction
on parallel imports will result in increased prices and thus a de-
crease in U.S. consumer welfare. The free-rider argument, when
confined to consumer deception by gray market importers selling
lower quality goods or providing lower quality services than those
provided by authorized sellers, is also straight-forward in terms of
policy. Because deception effects the "reputational" value of the
trademark, consumers incur losses in the form of fewer trademarks
on higher quality goods being offered in the market. Restrictions
on parallel imports are, therefore, welfare enhancing. A ban en-
forced by the Customs Department would appear to be an efficient
means of eliminating parallel imports, thereby protecting
consumers.
A policy of regulatory inaction protects consumers against
price discrimination, but provides no protection against deception.
A ban provides protection against deception and no protection
against price discrimination. Absent protectionist measures, reli-
ance on expert opinion would lead to the conclusion there is no
market power and, therefore, no price discrimination. But protec-
tionist measures are by design intended to create international
price discrimination. Reliance on limited evidence such as lower
gray market prices, independent warranties or refunds or replace-
States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) cert. granted sub nom. K-Mart v. Cartier, 107 S. Ct.
642 (1986). Copiat's attack on the Customs regulations failed in the lower court. The Dis-
trict Court held that the regulations were a sufficiently reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute, supported by its legislative history, legislative acquiescence, judicial decisions, and long-
standing practice of the agency charged with enforcement. The Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court on the substantive issue, directing it to issue a judgment declaring the
Customs regulations contrary to the statute they are meant to enforce. In its opinion, the
appellate court concluded that none of the factors cited by the District Court overcame the
literal language of the statute giving U.S. trademark owners an absolute right to exclude
genuine trademarked foreign goods.
The COPIAT decision creates a split between the circuits on the issue of the validity of
the Customs regulations. Earlier, in the Vivitar case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed a Court of International Trade decision upholding these regulations. Vivitar
v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). Moreover, another case raising this
issue has been decided in the Second Circuit. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F.Supp.
911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Ross, Court Deals Setback
to Gray Market, Wash. Post, May 7, 1986.
134. See, e.g., New Bill Would Permit Ban on Gray Market Goods, 34 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 511 (Sept. 17, 1987); Legislation to Protect Parallel Importation
Introduced in the Senate, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 10 (May 7, 1987).,
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ments, and limited consumer complaints suggest consumer decep-
tion is not a significant problem. A ban has conflicting consumer
welfare implications depending on whether it would facilitate col-
lusion and market power or increase welfare by eliminating free-
riding.13
A ban of parallel imports would benefit manufacturers by ei-
ther facilitating price discrimination or eliminating free-riding.
The possibility exists, however, that a ban may not be in some
manufacturers' interests. In Part II D, which examined retailers'
price margins that were contractually determined, it was concluded
that if U.S. price margins should adjust to exchange rate changes
in a competitive market, then U.S. vertical restraints that restrict
adjustments at the retail level may create post-contractual oppor-
tunities for manufacturers to adjust these margins by explicitly or
implicitly sanctioning a parallel market. Parts III C and D ex-
amined the Robinson-Patman Act as encouraging vertical re-
straints and distributional inefficiencies. The parallel market may
be a means to avoid the Robinson-Patman Act constraints and to
achieve distributional efficiency at the margin. In these cases, U.S.
consumers and foreign manufacturers gain at the expense of U.S.
retailers. The gain to consumers under standard welfare analysis
would exceed retailers' losses. Thus, a ban is not warranted.
Similar to the price discrimination and the free-rider hypothe-
ses, there is no conclusive evidence that parallel markets are sanc-
tioned by foreign manufacturers. Allegations by parallel importers,
and a labeling proposal (as opposed to a ban) advocated by a man-
ufacturer's interest group, support an inference that manufacturers
sanction parallel markets. 13 6 However, litigation by this same inter-
est group attempting to have Customs regulations (that permit
parallel imports) declared contrary to the Tariff Act of 1930, and
therefore unlawful, does not support a manufacturer-sanctioned
parallel market. If a recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision is up-
held, parallel imports will be banned."3 7
135. Included in the meaning of fostering collusion or market power is the creation of
rents for the exporting countries because of either U.S. protectionist measures or restrictive
export licensing agreements of foreign countries. These rents represent a loss in U.S. con-
sumer welfare not only because of the higher prices of imports, but also higher prices of
domestically produced goods because of the absence of lower priced competing imports. The
gray market dissipates these rents to the benefit of U.S. consumers.
136. See LEXECON, supra note 18. The Lexecon proposal can be interpreted on other
grounds.
137. Ross, supra note 113 (refering to the COPIAT case).
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Of the hypotheses examined, the free-rider hypothesis is the
only one that supports a ban. A ban, or import restriction, is in
effect a vertical restraint that eliminates parallel imports. A pri-
vate solution, it is argued, is not possible because vertical re-
straints are not enforced in foreign countries, and therefore, there
is no way to prevent parallel imports without a ban. The principal
difficulty with the free-rider argument is that multinational manu-
facturers should be expected to have made price adjustments in
foreign countries to adjust to prohibitions on export restrictions,
and foreign retailers can no longer be assured of a price margin to
provide marketing and services. If the manufacturer is to maintain
the value of the trademark in foreign countries, it must either ver-
tically integrate or have the national distributor undertake those
expenditures. In either case, free-riding would not be feasible. All
other things being equal, the manufacturer's or distributor's price
to retailers should be higher in foreign countries than it is in the
United States; but, if parallel importers purchase from foreign re-
tailers, how can parallel importers have a comparative cost advan-
tage over U.S. authorized retailers? The data clearly indicate that
parallel importers pay a lower price than U.S. authorized dealers.
A lower distributor price to foreign retailers is possible if the
efficiency gains in distribution costs, other than quality assurance,
offset the distributor's higher quality assurance premium. It has
been argued in Part II that there may be too much intrabrand
competition by authorized sellers in foreign countries because of
restrictions on vertical restraints, and too much interbrand compe-
tition by authorized sellers in the United States because of the re-
strictions imposed by Robinson-Patman. Parallel distribution in
the United States can be interpreted as a market adjustment that,
at the margin, increases intrabrand competition. Authorized sellers
who are not as efficient in their distribution as parallel importers
will incur losses, which are offset by the gain to the consumer in
the form of lower prices.
In summary, the free-rider argument is weakened by the evi-
dence that parallel importers pay a lower price than U.S. author-
ized dealers in light of foreign law. While it is possible that parallel
importers may still free-ride, the likelihood that their price in-
cludes a foreign premium for quality assurance and free-ridable
services, in conjunction with evidence that parallel importers offer
the same quality and services as authorized sellers while charging a
lower retail price, raises doubts of free-riding. Protectionist mea-
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sures in the United States are one explanation for parallel import-
ers being able to purchase at a lower price. The fall in the dollar in
the past year is consistent with a decline in gray market imports.
However, if Congress passes sweeping trade legislation, then we
may experience an upsurge in gray market imports."5 8
The overall conclusion of this paper is perhaps best summa-
rized by a poem from Robert Frost.
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.' 9
This paper has no definite conclusion as to whether a wall
against gray market goods should be built or not. It does, however,
provide alternative explanations of what would be walled in or
walled out and to whom it is likely to give offense. There are sev-
eral lessons to be learned from the gray market. The gray market,
domestic or international, may be a market adjustment that cir-
cumvents the inter-relationship between vertical restraints and the
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. Finally, the gray market
may also be a market adjustment to circumvent protectionist
legislation.
138. As of the date of publication of this article, Congress was stalled on the passage of
any comprehensive trade legislation. (Dec. 1987).
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